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Still Floating: Security-Based Swap Agreements After
Dodd-Frank
Thomas J. Molony

I.

∗

INTRODUCTION

Shortly before the United States Congress enacted the Dodd1
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“DoddFrank”), Senator Christopher Dodd, then-Chairman of the Senate
Banking Committee, suggested that no one will know how the law will
2
work until it becomes effective. The same might have been said almost ten years earlier about the provisions with respect to securitybased swap agreements included in the Commodity Futures Modern3
ization Act of 2000 (CFMA). The CFMA defined the term “securitybased swap agreement” for purposes of, among other things, the
4
general antifraud provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 (the “Secu5
rities Act”) and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange
Act”). Now, more than ten years after the CFMA was enacted, it remains unclear what the term means and how far it extends.
In a swap agreement, parties agree to exchange payments de6
termined with reference to a quantity of a specified asset. This quan∗

Assistant Professor, Elon University School of Law. I would like to thank Steve
Bradford, Tom Hazen, and Alan Palmiter for their helpful suggestions and comments and Nathan Standley and Marie Anders for their research and editorial assistance. All errors and omissions, of course, are my own.
1
Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (to be codified in scattered sections
of the U.S. Code).
2
David Cho, Jia Lynn Yang & Brady Dennis, Lawmakers Guide Dodd-Frank Bill for
Wall Street Reform into Homestretch, WASH. POST (June 26, 2010),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/25/AR20100
62500675.html.
3
Pub. L. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763A-365 (codified in scattered sections of 7, 11, 12,
and 15 U.S. Code). The CFMA was enacted as part of the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000) (codified in scattered
sections of the U.S. Code).
4
15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2006).
5
Id. §§ 78a–78nn.
6
Roberta Romano, A Thumbnail Sketch of Derivative Securities and Their Regulation,
55 MD. L. REV. 1, 46 (1996).
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tity is referred to as the “notional” amount, and the notional amount
7
itself typically is not exchanged.
Swaps take many different forms, vary in complexity, and are
8
used for different purposes. Perhaps the simplest form is an interest
rate swap. In an interest rate swap, the parties agree to exchange
payments calculated by multiplying interest rates by a notional
amount equal to an amount of money.
Borrowers often use interest rate swaps to hedge against the risk
9
of changes in interest rates. For example, a borrower who is obligated on a $1 million loan that bears interest at a variable rate per an10
num equal to the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) is subject to changes in LIBOR. If LIBOR averages four percent during a
year, the borrower’s annual financing cost is $40,000. If LIBOR averages eight percent, the borrower pays $80,000. To eliminate the risk
of changes in LIBOR, the borrower might enter into a floating-tofixed interest rate swap. Under the swap, the borrower would agree
to make periodic payments determined by multiplying a “fixed rate”
of, perhaps, six percent per annum by a notional amount equal to $1
million, the outstanding principal under the loan. In exchange, the
other party—known as the counterparty—would agree to make periodic payments determined by multiplying a “floating rate” of LIBOR
11
by the notional amount. By entering into the swap, the borrower
fixes its annual net financing cost at $60,000. If LIBOR averages four
12
percent during a year, the borrower’s net financing cost is $60,000.

7

Id.
See PHILIP MCBRIDE JOHNSON & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, DERIVATIVES REGULATION
§ 1.02[8], at 56 (2004) (indicating that swaps generally are used to hedge risks, but
also may be used for “purely speculative purposes”).
9
See id. (noting that swaps are used as hedges against “the risk of adverse changes in interest rates”).
10
The London InterBank Offered Rate
is produced for ten currencies with 15 maturities quoted for each—
ranging from overnight to 12 months—thus producing 150 rates each
business day. [LIBOR] is a benchmark giving an indication of the average rate at which a leading bank can obtain unsecured funding . . .
for a given period, in a given currency.
The Basics, BBA LIBOR, http://bbalibor.bladonmore.com/bbalibor-explained/thebasics (last visited Mar. 16, 2012).
11
Typically, the periodic payments are netted against each other, with the party
owing the higher amount paying the other party the difference between the two
amounts.
12
The borrower’s total payments would be $100,000—$40,000 in interest to the
lender and a $60,000 fixed rate payment to the swap counterparty. Offsetting those
payments would be a $40,000 floating rate payment from the counterparty.
8
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If LIBOR averages eight percent, the borrower’s net financing cost is
13
the same.
A swap is a type of derivative, which means that it derives its val14
ue from some other asset. Before the CFMA was enacted, the extent
to which swaps and other derivatives were subject to federal securities
laws was uncertain. The CFMA attempted to eliminate this uncer15
tainty with respect to certain over-the-counter derivatives —those
that are both between sophisticated parties and subject to individual
negotiation—by excluding them from the definition of “security” for
purposes of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act and thereby
making the onerous registration and information reporting require16
ments of those laws inapplicable to them. At the same time, however, the CFMA made a specific type or category of over-the-counter derivatives—security-based swap agreements—subject to existing
17
antifraud provisions of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act.
The CFMA defined the term “security-based swap agreement” as
“a swap agreement . . . of which a material term is based on the price,
yield, value, or volatility of any security or any group or index of secu18
rities, or any interest therein.” Since the CFMA was enacted, very
few courts have interpreted the term, and it was not until 2008 that
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) brought its first antifraud enforcement action with respect to a security-based swap
19
agreement. In SEC v. Langford, the SEC alleged that the former
13
The borrower’s total payments would be $140,000—$80,000 in interest to the
lender and a $60,000 fixed rate payment to the swap counterparty. Offsetting those
payments would be an $80,000 floating rate payment from the counterparty.
14
See Romano, supra note 6, at 2 (noting that a derivative’s value is based on another asset); Over-The-Counter Derivatives: Modernizing Oversight to Increase Transparency
and Reduce Risks: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Securities, Insurance, and Investment of
the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 110th Cong. 45 (2009) [hereinafter Schapiro Testimony] (statement of Hon. Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, U.S. Sec. &
Exch.
Comm’n),
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2009/ts062209mls.htm (indicating that a derivative is based on the value of a “reference” asset or event).
15
An over-the-counter derivative is one that “is not traded on a regulated exchange.” Schapiro Testimony, supra note 14, at 45.
16
CFMA, Pub. L. 106-554, §§ 302(a), 303(a), 114 Stat. 2763, 2763A-451 to 2763A453 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b-1, 78c-1 (2006)).
17
Id. §§ 302(b), 303(d), 114 Stat. at 2763A-452, 2763A-454 (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77q(a), 78j(b) (2006)).
18
Id. § 301(a), 114 Stat. at 2763A-451 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78c note) (adding
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act section 206B), repealed by Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, § 762(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1759 (2010)).
19
Litigation Release No. 20545, 2008 WL 1902075 (Apr. 30, 2008) [hereinafter
Langford Release] (describing the initiation of the Langford enforcement action).
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president of the Jefferson County, Alabama, commission and two of
his friends, one a broker-dealer and one a lobbyist, violated Securities
Act section 17(a) and Exchange Act section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 in
connection with interest rate swaps (valued at approximately $3.5 billion in total) entered into with respect to various series of bonds is20
sued by Jefferson County. In 2009, the SEC brought a related enforcement action against two managing directors of J.P. Morgan
Securities, Inc. In SEC v. LeCroy, the SEC alleged that the J.P. Morgan
managing directors violated Securities Act section 17(a) and Exchange Act section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 with respect to three of the
Jefferson County interest rate swaps (valued at approximately $2 bil21
lion in total) at issue in Langford. Langford and LeCroy bring to the
fore the question of how far the term “security-based swap agreement” extends and, more specifically, whether it is so broad that it
may include a simple interest rate swap.
The over-the-counter derivatives market is enormous. Since December 2008, the market value of over-the-counter derivative con22
tracts has exceeded $20 trillion. During that time, the market value
23
of interest rate swaps alone has exceeded $12.5 trillion. Enacted in
response to the financial crisis that began at the end of the last decade, Dodd-Frank brings sweeping regulation to this huge segment of
the economy that the CFMA largely left unregulated. The reform Act
divides the over-the-counter derivatives market into two segments,
putting the SEC in charge of one and the Commodity Futures Trad24
ing Commission (CFTC) in charge of the other. The category over
which the CFTC has general jurisdiction includes security-based swap
agreements, though the term is more narrowly defined. The SEC,
however, continues to have the same antifraud jurisdiction over secu25
rity-based swap agreements that it had previously. Therefore, the interpretation of the term remains important in defining the reach of
the federal securities antifraud provisions.
20
Complaint ¶¶ 1–5, 11–12, SEC v. Langford, No. CV-08-B-0761-S (N.D. Ala. Apr.
30,
2008)
[hereinafter
Langford
Complaint],
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2008/comp20545.pdf.
21
Complaint ¶¶ 1—14, SEC v. LeCroy, No. CV-09-B-2238-S (N.D. Ala. Nov. 4,
2009)
[hereinafter
LeCroy
Complaint],
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2009/comp21280.pdf.
22
BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, BIS QUARTERLY REVIEW, JUNE 2011 app. at A131
tbl.19 (2011) (on file with the Seton Hall Law Review).
23
Id.
24
See infra Part IV (describing the jurisdiction of the SEC and the CFTC under
Dodd-Frank).
25
See infra Part IV (discussing the effect of Dodd-Frank).
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This Article examines the historical interpretation of the term
“security-based swap agreement,” its application in Langford and
LeCroy, and the continuing viability of applying antifraud provisions
of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act to security-based swap
agreements post-Dodd-Frank. It concludes that Congress should
eliminate application of antifraud provisions in the federal securities
laws to security-based swap agreements because continued application is unnecessary and undesirable after Dodd-Frank.
Part II of this Article discusses the extent to which the securities
laws applied to swaps prior to Dodd-Frank and includes a review and
critique of the handful of opinions that have considered the scope of
the term “security-based swap agreement” as defined before DoddFrank. Part III considers whether the interest rate swaps at issue in
Langford and LeCroy were security-based swap agreements under the
pre-Dodd-Frank definition. It offers a reasonable argument that they
were based on the statutory text, but suggests that such a result makes
little sense from a policy perspective. Part IV describes generally the
jurisdictional division between the SEC and the CFTC under DoddFrank and how security-based swap agreements fit within the new regime. Part V explores reasons to do away with the “security-based
swap agreement” concept in the federal securities laws while considering the possible benefits of retaining it. Finally, Part VI concludes
that Congress should eliminate the “security-based swap agreement”
concept from the Securities Act and the Exchange Act because the
applicable provisions went largely unused pre-Dodd-Frank and likely
will be even more inconsequential post-reform, an appropriate allocation of securities antifraud jurisdiction can be achieved without the
term, the term has been poorly interpreted and is overly broad, and
the term results in redundancy and confusion in the new regulatory
scheme.
II. TREATMENT OF SWAPS UNDER THE SECURITIES LAWS PRIOR TO
DODD-FRANK
A. Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000
Section 17(a) of the Securities Act and section 10(b) of the Exchange Act are two of the primary antifraud provisions of the federal
securities laws. Rule 10b-5 was promulgated under section 10(b) in
26
1942 and, since then, has served as a “powerful antifraud weapon.”
Securities Act section 17(a) prohibits fraud “in the offer or sale of any
26

THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW
(2009).

OF

SECURITIES REGULATION § 12.3[2], at 442
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27

securities,” and Exchange Act section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 prohibit
28
fraud “in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.” Prior
to the CFMA, if a transaction did not involve a security, it was not subject to section 17(a), section 10(b), or Rule 10b-5.
Until the CFMA was enacted, whether a swap could be a security
was an open question. A single 1996 opinion by the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Ohio had concluded that
29
two specific interest rate swaps were not securities, but not surpris-

27
28

15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (2006) (emphasis added).
Id. § 78j(b) (emphasis added); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(c) (2011) (emphasis add-

ed).
29

Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 925 F. Supp. 1270, 1283 (S.D.
Ohio 1996). Both swaps at issue in Proctor & Gamble were leveraged interest rate
swaps. Under one of the swaps, which the district court referred to as the “5s/30s
swap,” Bankers Trust agreed to pay a fixed rate equal to 5.30%, and in return, Proctor & Gamble agreed to pay a floating rate equal to the prevailing commercial paper
rate minus seventy-five basis points plus, after the first six months, a spread determined in reference to the yields and prices of certain treasury securities. Id. at 1276.
In concluding that the 5s/30s swap was not a security under the Securities Act or the
Exchange Act, the court specifically determined that it (i) was not an investment
contract because it did not involve a “common enterprise” or the entrepreneurial
efforts of others as required by SEC v. Howey, 328 U.S. 293 (1946), and was not an
“instrument commonly known as a security” for the same reasons; (ii) was not a note
or evidence of indebtedness because there was no exchange of principal and the
facts with respect to the swap did not meet the requirements of the “family resemblance” test set out by the Supreme Court in Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56
(1990); and (iii) was not an option because, even though it was based on a security, it
did not give either party the right to take possession of a security. Proctor & Gamble,
925 F. Supp. at 1278–80, 1282–83, 1293.
In reaching its decision, the Proctor & Gamble court noted that it was not bound by
the SEC’s decision in two related administrative proceedings that a “Treasury-Linked
Swap,” a swap quite similar to the 5s/30s swap in Proctor & Gamble, was a security. Id.
at 1281 (citing In re Vazquez, Securities Act Release No. 33-7269, Exchange Act Release No. 34-36906, 1996 WL 86528 (Feb. 29, 1996); In re BT Sec. Corp., Securities
Act Release No. 33-7124, Exchange Act Release No. 34-35136, 1994 WL 710743 (Dec.
22, 1994)). In BT Securities and Vazquez, the SEC observed that the “Treasury-Linked
Swap” was not truly a swap, but in substance was a cash-settled option based on the
price and yields of treasury securities. Vazquez, 1996 WL 86528, at *4 n.4; BT Securities, 1994 WL 710743, at *9 n.6. According to the SEC, as an option based on securities, the swap was also a security. BT Securities, 1994 WL 710743, at *9 n. 6.
In 2002, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit concluded that
Proctor & Gamble was incorrect in finding that, for an option to be a security, the instrument must contain a right to exercise and take possession of a security. Caiola v.
Citibank, N.A., 295 F.3d 312, 326 (2d Cir. 2002). To the contrary, the Second Circuit observed that the definition of “security” under the Exchange Act includes a
cash-settled option on a security. Id. at 325. The Caiola opinion, which determined
that a cash-settled option on a security is itself a security, does not necessarily indicate
that the 5s/30s swap in Proctor & Gamble was also a security. The Second Circuit in
Caiola observed that the definition of “security” in Exchange Act section 3(a)(10)
does not “distinguish between options documented as swaps as opposed to options
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ingly, that decision alone could not quell the uncertainty surrounding the treatment of swaps under the federal securities laws. Viewing
30
the uncertainty as detrimental to the marketplace, Congress enacted
the CFMA in 2000.
The CFMA resolved the uncertainty through amendments to the
31
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA), the Securities Act, and the Exchange Act. The CFMA amended the GLBA to add section 206A,
which defined the term “swap agreement” broadly to include, among
other things,
any agreement, contract, or transaction between eligible contract
participants . . . , the material terms of which (other than price
and quantity) are subject to individual negotiation, and that . . .
provides on an executory basis for the exchange, on a fixed or
contingent basis, of one or more payments based on the value or
level of one or more interest or other rates, currencies, commodities, securities, instruments of indebtedness, indices, quantitative
measures, or other financial or economic interests or property of
any kind, or any interest therein or based on the value thereof,
and that transfers, as between the parties to the transaction, in
whole or in part, the financial risk associated with a future change
in any such value or level without also conveying a current or future direct or indirect ownership interest in an asset . . . or liability
that incorporates the financial risk so transferred, including any
such agreement, contract, or transaction commonly known as an
interest rate swap, including a rate floor, rate cap, rate collar,
cross-currency rate swap, basis swap, currency swap, equity index
swap, equity swap, debt index swap, debt swap, credit spread,

documented in some other fashion,” but indicated that it was not addressing whether
an “interest rate swap” with “option-like features” is a security. Id. at 326.
30
One of the goals of the CFMA was to provide certainty that swap agreements
generally were not subject to securities laws or commodities laws. See CFMA, Pub. L.
No. 106-554, § 2(6), 114 Stat. 2763A-365, 2763A-366 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 1 note
(2006)) (stating that one of the purposes of the Act was the “reduc[tion of] systemic
risk by enhancing legal certainty in the markets for certain futures and derivatives
transactions”); see also 146 CONG. REC. 27,176 (2000) (statement of Sen. Gramm) (“It
is important to note that nothing in the title should be read to imply that swap
agreements are either securities or futures contracts.”); 146 CONG. REC. 27,077
(2000) (statement of Rep. Dingell) (“[One of t]he fundamental purposes of [the
CFMA is] . . . to provide legal certainty for the over-the counter derivatives market.”).
Congress placed the definition of “swap agreement” in the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
because it is “a neutral statute . . . that is not specifically part of a banking, securities,
or commodities law.” 146 CONG. REC. 27, 176 (2000) (statement of Sen. Gramm).
31
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78c note (2006).
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credit default swap, credit swap, weather swap, or commodity
32
swap . . . .

The CFMA then divided swap agreements into two types—“securitybased swap agreements” and “non-security-based swap agreements”—
through the addition of sections 206B and 206C to the GLBA. The
term “security-based swap agreement” was defined as “a swap agreement . . . of which a material term is based on the price, yield, value,
or volatility of any security or any group or index of securities, or any
33
interest therein;” the term “non-security-based swap agreement”
34
meant everything else. Finally, the CFMA added Section 2A to the
Securities Act and section 3A to the Exchange Act, both of which
provided that the definition of “security” included neither type of
35
swap agreement.
The combined effect of the CFMA amendments to the GLBA,
the Securities Act, and the Exchange Act was to remove all swap
agreements from the registration and reporting requirements of the
36
Securities Act and the Exchange Act. The CFMA, however, did not
32
CFMA § 301(a), 114 Stat. at 2763A-449 to 2763A-450 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §
78c note (2006)) (adding Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act section 206A). The CFMA
housed the definition of “eligible contract participant” in section 1a(12) of the
Commodity Exchange Act. Id. § 101, 114 Stat. at 2763A-368 to 2763A-371 (codified
at 7 U.S.C. § 1a(12) (2006)). Under Section 1a(12), eligible contract participants
include sophisticated persons and entities such as financial institutions; regulated
insurance companies; regulated investment companies; certain commodity pools;
corporations, partnerships, proprietorships, organizations, trusts, and other entities
that have a minimum of total assets; certain employee benefit plans; governmental
entities and political subdivisions, instrumentalities, agencies, and departments
thereof that own and invest on a discretionary basis a minimum amount of investments; certain brokers and dealers; and individuals with a minimum of total assets.
Id.
33
CFMA § 301(a), 114 Stat. at 2763A-451 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78c note
(2006)) (adding Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act section 206B), repealed by Dodd-Frank Act,
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 762(a), 124 Stat. at 1376, 1759 (2010).
34
See id. (adding Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 206C), repealed by Dodd-Frank Act §
762(a), 124 Stat. at 1376, 1759 (“[T]he term ‘nonsecurity-based swap agreement’
means any swap agreement . . . that is not a security-based swap agreement.”).
35
See 15 U.S.C. § 77b-1(b)(1) (2006) (“[T]he definition of ‘security’. . . does not
include any security-based swap agreement.”); id. § 78c-1(b)(1) (same); id. § 77b1(b)(1) ( “[T]he definition of ‘security’ . . . does not include any non-security-based
swap agreement”); id. § 78c-1(a) (same).
36
The CFMA amendments to the Securities Act and the Exchange Act did not
necessarily establish that all swaps were not securities. The definition of “swap
agreement” in GLBA section 206A includes several exceptions. See Gramm-LeachBliley Act § 206A(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78c note (2006) (listing exclusions from the term
“swap agreement”). Moreover, if a party to a swap was not an eligible contract participant or the material terms were not subject to individual negotiation, the swap was
not considered a swap agreement under GLBA, and therefore Securities Act section
2A and Exchange Act section 3A would not exclude the swap from the definition of se-
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exclude swap agreements so broadly from the reach of the antifraud
provisions of those laws. Although Securities Act §§ 2A(b)(2) and (3)
and Exchange Act §§ 3A(b)(2) and (3) generally prohibited the SEC
from taking “prophylactic measures against fraud, manipulation, or
insider trading with respect to any security-based swap agreements,”
the CFMA amended the antifraud provisions in section 17(a) of the
Securities Act and section 10(b) of the Exchange Act to include secu37
rity-based swap agreements within their scope.
B. Opinions Addressing Security-Based Swap Agreements
The pre-Dodd-Frank definition of “security-based swap agree38
ment” consists of five components. For an agreement, contract, or
transaction to be a security-based swap agreement:
• the agreement, contract, or transaction must be a swap
agreement;
• the swap agreement must have a term that relates to a
price, yield, value, or volatility;
• the term must be based on the price, yield, value, or volatility;
• the price, yield, value, or volatility must be of a security, a
group or index of securities, or an interest in a security or group
or index of securities; and
39
• the term must be material.

curity under Securities Act section 2(a)(1) and Exchange Act section 3(a)(10). See §
206A(a).
37
CFMA §§ 302(b), 303(d), 114 Stat. at 2763A-452, 2763A-454 (codified at 15
U.S.C. §§ 77q(a), 78j (2006)). The CFMA also made security-based swap agreements
subject to the antimanipulation provisions of the Exchange Act sections 9(a),
15(c)(1), 16(a) and (b), 20(d), and 21A(a)(1). Id. § 303(b)–(c), (e)–(k), 114 Stat. at
2763A-453 to 2763A-454, 2763A-454 to 2763A-456 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i, 78o,
78p, 78t, 78u-1 (2006)). It amended Exchange Act section 10(b) to provide that security-based swap agreements were subject to rules under section 10(b) , including
Rule 10b-5, and to judicial precedents under Securities Act section 17(a) and Exchange Act sections 9(a), 10(b), 15(c)(1), 16(a) and (b), 20(d), and 21A(a)(1). Id.
§ 302 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2006)). No specific amendment to the text of
Rule 10b-5 therefore was required, and the SEC, accordingly, has never amended
Rule 10b-5 to reference security-based swap agreements. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5
(2012).
38
The post-Dodd-Frank definition includes the same five components, but excludes any “security-based swap” from the definition. See infra notes 199–202 and accompanying text (describing how Dodd-Frank amended the definition of “securitybased swap agreement”). The term “security-based swap” is a new term added by
Dodd-Frank. See infra note 196 and accompanying text (discussing the term “security-based swap”).
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Since the CFMA was enacted, very few opinions have been issued
in cases involving swaps described as security-based swap agreements
and only one of those opinions— the 2010 opinion of the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York in SEC v.
40
Rorech —has given studied attention to the definition of the term.
Rorech offered important guidance as to two components of the definition—when a term is based on price, yield, value, or volatility and
when a term is material.
Unfortunately, opinions in other cases involving security-based
swap agreements have done little to develop the contours of the definition. These other opinions fit into one of two categories. In one
category are the opinions in St. Matthew’s Baptist Church v. Wachovia
41
Bank, National Ass’n and School District of the City of Erie v. J.P. Morgan
42
Chase Bank, which summarily excluded LIBOR-based interest rate
swaps from the definition merely because LIBOR is not determined
in reference to any security. In the other category are the opinions in
Caiola v. Citibank, N.A., which merely made conclusory statements
43
that the swaps at issue were security-based swap agreements, and the
44
45
opinions in Elliott Assocs. v. Porsche Automobil Holding SE, SEC v. Wyly,
46
and SEC v. Goldman Sachs & Co., which did not address whether the
47
swaps involved met the definition.
1.

Rorech

In Rorech, the SEC alleged that Jon-Paul Rorech and Renato
Negrin had engaged in illegal insider trading with respect to two
48
49
credit default swaps (CDSs). Each of the CDSs referenced VNU

39

See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 206B, 15 U.S.C. § 78c note (2006), repealed by
Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 762(a), 124 Stat. at 1376, 1759 (2010)
(amending 15 U.S.C. § 78c note) (defining the term “security-based swap agreement”).
40
720 F. Supp. 2d 367 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
41
No. Civ.A. 04-4540(FLW), 2005 WL 1199045 (D.N.J. May 18, 2005).
42
No. 08 CV 07688LAP, 08 CV 07982, 2009 WL 234128 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2009).
43
295 F.3d 312, 316 (2d Cir. 2002); Caiola v. Citibank, N.A, 137 F. Supp. 2d 362
(S.D.N.Y. 2001), rev’d 295 F.3d 312.
44
759 F. Supp. 2d 469 (2010).
45
No. 10 Civ. 5760 (SAS), 2011 WL 1226381 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2011).
46
No. 10 Civ. 3229(BSJ)(MHD), 2011 WL 2305988 (S.D.N.Y. June 10, 2011).
47
The opinions that have been issued in LeCroy and Langford, likewise, do not
address whether the swaps at issue meet the definition of “security-based swap
agreement.” Those opinions are described in Part III infra.
48
SEC v. Rorech, 720 F. Supp. 2d 367, 370, 404–05 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
49
The District Court in Rorech explained how a typical CDS works:
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N.V., a Dutch company, and a particular VNU bond. Each also had
a notional amount of $10 million and required the buyer to pay a
51
price, or “spread,” of 383 basis points (3.83 %) on a quarterly basis.
The swaps further provided that, upon the occurrence of certain
credit events with respect to VNU, the swap seller would pay the notional amount to the swap buyer and the swap buyer would deliver
52
the referenced VNU bond to the swap seller.
The SEC argued that the CDSs were security-based swap agreements subject to the antifraud provisions of Exchange Act section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 because their price was based on the price,
53
yield, value, or volatility of VNU bonds, which were securities. The
defendants, though willing to acknowledge that the price of the swaps
might be related to the price, yield, value, or volatility of the VNU
bonds, denied that the price was based on the price, yield, value or
54
volatility of the VNU bonds. The defendants argued that the term
“based on” requires a “direct, or exclusive dependence” and that factors unrelated to the VNU bonds were incorporated in pricing the
swaps—factors such as general market conditions and the market’s
55
determination of the risk that VNU would not meet its obligations.
The defendants also argued that the material terms of the CDSs were
not “based on” the price, yield, value, or volatility of the VNU bonds
because the swap contracts themselves did not “explicitly refer to the
While there are different types of CDSs, the CDSs that are at issue in
this case are contracts that provide protection against the credit risk of
a particular company. The seller of a CDS agrees to pay the buyer a
specific sum of money, called the notional amount, if a credit event,
such as bankruptcy, occurs in the referenced company. If a credit
event occurs, the buyer generally must provide to the seller any of certain debt instruments that are deliverable pursuant to the CDS contract. In exchange for this risk protection from the CDS-seller, the
CDS-buyer agrees to make periodic premium payments during the
course of the contract. The CDS-buyer can use the CDS to provide
protection, like insurance, against the possibility that the debt instruments the buyer holds will seriously deteriorate in value because of a
credit event in the referenced company. The CDS-buyer could also
buy the CDS without owning the underlying referenced security, a “naked CDS,” in the expectation that it would increase in value based on
any one of a number of factors including the likelihood that a credit
event will occur in the referenced company.
Id. at 370–71.
50
Id. at 371, 387.
51
Id. at 387.
52
Id. at 370–71, 387.
53
Id. at 405.
54
Rorech, 720 F. Supp. 2d at 405
55
Id. at 405.
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price or value of any security.” The defendants observed that the
57
price of each CDS was simply stated in basis points.
Although the district court ultimately entered judgment in favor
of the defendants because the SEC failed to offer sufficient evidence
58
to support insider trading, the court agreed with the SEC that the
59
swaps were security-based swap agreements. The court concluded
that, to be “based on” the price, yield, value, or volatility of the VNU
bonds, the price of the VNU swaps need not have been exclusively
60
connected to one of those elements. Noting that the GLBA did not
define the term “based on,” the court applied the ordinary meaning
of the term, stating that “it means to use as the fundamental part or
61
ingredient of, or principal component of, something.” According to
the court, applying the ordinary meaning was appropriate in light of
the term’s context within the GLBA and its place within the securities
62
antifraud regime. The court asserted, moreover, that the legislative
history of the GLBA indicated that Congress intended to sweep
broadly to bring “novel financial instruments” within the scope of the
Exchange Act’s antifraud provisions and that requiring an explicit
reference to a security in a swap agreement would be inconsistent
63
with that intent.
Looking to the ordinary meaning of “based on,” the district
court concluded that the CDSs at issue in the case were security-based
swap agreements for two reasons. First, the spread (or yield), price,
and value of VNU bonds deliverable under the CDSs were a “fundamental” consideration of the buyer in evaluating the price to pay for
64
the swaps. Second, the documents governing each CDS included a
provision under which cash settlement of the swap was to be calculat65
ed using the price of VNU obligations deliverable under the swap.
The court determined that this provision was material because the
amount to be delivered at settlement “was plainly part of, if not all of,

56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

Id.
Id.
Id. at 415–17.
Id. at 408.
Rorech, 720 F. Supp. 2d at 405.
Id.
Id. at 406.
Id. at 406–07.
Id. at 407.
Id. at 408.
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the consideration for which the CDS-buyer agreed to make premium
66
payments.”
Rorech provides valuable guidance as to how to determine
whether a term is material and what it means for a term to be based on
price, yield, value, or volatility. Regarding materiality, Rorech simply
indicates that “[t]he material terms of a contract are those that must
be sufficiently definite to allow the contract to be enforceable. Examples . . . include subject matter, price, payment terms, quantity,
67
timing, compensation, and duration.” With respect to the meaning
of “based on,” Rorech makes two significant points. First, for a term to
be “based on” price, yield, value, or volatility means only that the
price, yield, value, or volatility must be a principal or fundamental
68
69
part of the term. A direct or exclusive relationship is not required.
Second, a swap agreement itself need not specifically reference price,
yield, value, or volatility. It is sufficient that price, yield, value, or vol70
atility be used in evaluating the relevant term.
Rorech’s parameters for the term “based on” are reasonable in
light of the legislative history of the CFMA. As the opinion noted, the
71
legislative history, albeit slim, suggests that Congress intended the
term “security-based swap agreement” to be flexible enough to ad72
dress new types of instruments. A narrow interpretation of “based
on” would deprive it of that flexibility.

66

Rorech, 720 F. Supp. 2d at 408.
Id.
68
Id. at 407.
69
See id. at 407 (noting that requiring “a direct, explicit relationship . . . would
allow traders to escape the ambit of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 through clever
drafting”).
70
See id. at 407 (noting that, in deciding whether to purchase the CDSs at issue in
Rorech, the swap buyer considered the yield, price, and value of the referenced
bonds).
71
Caiola v. Citibank, N.A. 137 F. Supp. 2d 362, 371 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (“The legislative history of the CFMA concerning security-based swap agreements is sparse . . . .”).
72
See, e.g., 146 CONG. REC. 27,309 (2000) (statement of Sen. Sarbanes) (“Title III
[of the CFMA] applies anti-fraud and anti-manipulation provisions of the Federal
securities laws to securities-based swap agreements . . . . This will enhance protection
for investors and for the financial markets, and will permit the SEC to respond as
necessary to developments in these markets.”); 146 CONG. REC. 27,078 (2000) (statement of Rep. Dingell) (“One of the most important provisions of the [CFMA] . . .
gives the SEC antifraud authority over securities-based swap agreements . . . . This
permits the SEC to use its tested methods to enhance the protection in [the swap]
markets and to respond as necessary to developments in the future.”); see also Rorech,
720 F. Supp. 2d at 406 (“Administration officials and congressional members expressed support for making it clear that the SEC’s traditional anti-fraud and insider
trading enforcement authority applied to novel financial instruments.”).
67
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Although Rorech’s ultimate explanation of the meaning of “based
on” seems correct, the court’s discussion of how the GLBA statutory
scheme supports its conclusion that the CDSs at issue in the case met
the “based on” requirement is peculiar. In reaching its conclusion,
the court reasoned that Congress must have intended the CDSs at issue in the case to be subject to Exchange Act section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 because Congress had included in the broad definition of
“swap agreement” both interest rate swaps, “which clearly are not ‘se73
curity based swap agreements,’” and CDSs. For that and other reasons, according to the court, it was appropriate to conclude that the
CDSs at issue were “based on” the price, yield, value, or volatility of
74
the VNU bonds and therefore were security-based swap agreements.
The court’s statement that interest rate swaps “clearly” are not
security-based swap agreements suggests that the court blindly followed, and extended to all interest rate swaps, the conclusion
reached in both St. Matthew’s and School District of Erie that LIBOR75
based interest rate swaps are not security-based swap agreements. A
plain interpretation of the GLBA belies the clarity that Rorech declared. Under GLBA section 206A, the definition of “swap agree76
ment” includes interest rate swaps. The definition of “security-based
swap agreement” in GLBA section 206B simply is “a swap agreement
(as defined in section 206A of [GLBA]) of which a material term is
based on the price, yield, value, or volatility of any security or any
77
group of index of securities, or any interest therein.” Taking these
two definitions together, then, an interest rate swap “of which a material term is based on the price, yield, value, or volatility of any security
or any group of index of securities, or any interest therein” is a security-based swap agreement. If Congress had intended to exclude interest rate swaps from the definition, it could have done so explicitly
in the definition of “security-based swap agreement.” Congress did
not.

73

Rorech, 720 F. Supp. 2d at 406.
See id. at 408.
75
See id. at 406 (citing Sch. Dist. of Erie v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, No. 08 CV
07688, 08 CV 07982, 2009 WL 234128, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2009); St. Matthew’s
Baptist Church v. Wachovia Bank Nat’l Ass’n, No. Civ.A. 04-4540(FLW), 2005 WL
1199045, at *12–13 (D.N.J. May 18, 2005)).
76
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 206A(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 78c note (2006).
77
Id. § 206B, repealed by Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 762(a), 124 Stat.
1376, 1759 (2010).
74
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St. Matthew’s and School District of Erie

About five years before Rorech, the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey in St. Matthew’s Baptist Church v. Wachovia Bank National Ass’n considered the substance of the term “security-based swap agreement” in connection with a private cause of
78
action under Exchange Act section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. St. Matthew’s Baptist Church alleged that Wachovia had violated Exchange
Act section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 with respect to a floating-to-fixed
79
interest rate swap the church had entered into with Wachovia. The
church had obtained an approximately $5 million loan from Wachovia and delivered to Wachovia a note under which the church
agreed to pay interest at a rate equal to one-month LIBOR plus
80
1.50%. Approximately two months before, in anticipation of the
loan, the parties had entered into an interest rate swap with a notion81
Under the
al amount equal to the principal amount of the loan.
swap, the church agreed to make payments to Wachovia based on a
fixed rate equal to 9.13%, and Wachovia agreed to make payments to
82
the church based on a floating rate equal to LIBOR plus 1.50%.
The church argued that the swap was a security-based swap
agreement subject to the antifraud provisions of Exchange Act section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 because the floating rate under the swap
83
was based on LIBOR. The district court disagreed, taking judicial
notice of the British Bankers’ Association’s explanation that LIBOR is
an interest rate and concluding “therefore [that LIBOR is] not an index based on the ‘price, yield, value, or volatility of any security or
78
St. Matthew’s, 2005 WL 1199045 (D.N.J. May 18, 2005). Although Exchange
Act section 10(b) does not expressly provide for a private cause of action and nothing indicates that Congress intended a private cause of action, the United States Supreme Court, following a long line of cases from the lower courts, determined that a
private cause of action indeed exists. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421
U.S. 723, 729–30 (1975). The general consensus is that no similar private cause of
action exists under Securities Act section 17(a). See, e.g., Koehler v. Bank of Berm.
(N.Y.) Ltd., 209 F.3d 130, 136 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing Finkel v. Stratton Corp., 962
F.2d 169, 174–75 (2d Cir. 1992) (indicating that no private right of action exists under section 17(a))); Maldonado v. Dominguez, 137 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1998) (“In recent years, every circuit to have addressed the issue has refused to recognize a private
right of action . . . .”).
79
St. Matthew’s, 2005 WL 1199045, at *2.
80
Id. The opinion incorrectly states that the interest rate on the note was onemonth LIBOR plus 150%. Id. The actual rate was one-month LIBOR plus 150 basis
points or 1.5%. Complaint at 25, St. Matthew’s Baptist Church v. Wachovia Bank
Nat’l Ass’n, No. Civ.A. 04-4540(FLW),(D.N.J. May 18, 2005).
81
St. Matthew’s, 2005 WL 1199045, at *1.
82
Id.
83
Id. at *13.
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84

any group or index of securities.’” As a result, according to the
85
court, the swap was not a security-based swap agreement.
The court in St. Matthew’s reached the right result, but not necessarily for the right reason. The definition of swap agreement in
86
GLBA section 206A specifically includes interest rate swaps. For a
floating-to-fixed interest rate swap, both the floating rate and the
fixed rate are material because each rate represents the “price” paid to
87
receive the other rate. The floating rate under the swap at issue in
St. Matthew’s, LIBOR plus 1.50%, was the very same rate as the interest rate in the note; therefore, one easily could conclude that the
floating swap rate was based on the interest rate in the note. The interest rate on the note was more than a fundamental part of determining the floating rate—it was the floating rate.
The St. Matthew’s court incorrectly suggested that the relevant
question in the case was whether LIBOR was an index based on “the
price, yield, value, or volatility of any security or any group or index
of securities.” The definition of security-based swap agreement, however, requires that a material term of the swap agreement be based on
“the price, yield, value, or volatility of any security or any group or index of securities or any interest therein.” Because the floating and
fixed rates under the swap were material terms and because the floating rate was based on the interest rate under the note, the questions
that the court should have asked were whether the note was a security
and whether the identity of the floating rate and the variable interest
rate meant that either the floating rate or the fixed rate was based on
the price, yield, value or volatility of an interest in the note. In St.
Matthew’s, the former question was an easy one. The note was not a
88
security under Reves v. Ernst & Young, and for that reason alone, the
84

Id.
See id. (dismissing the federal securities claims).
86
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 206A(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 78c note (2006).
87
See SEC v. Rorech, 720 F. Supp. 2d 367, 408 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“The material
terms of a contract are those terms that must be sufficiently definite to allow the contract to be enforceable. Examples . . . include subject matter, price, payment terms,
quantity, timing, compensation, and duration.”).
88
494 U.S. 56 (1990). Although Securities Act section 2(a)(1) and Exchange Act
section 3(a)(10) both include “note” in the definition of “security,” the United States
Supreme Court has determined that not all notes are securities. Id. at 63. The note
in St. Matthew’s was issued to refinance a short-term loan for the construction of
church facilities. St. Matthew’s, 2005 WL 1199045, at *1. Under Reves, the St. Matthew’s note would not be a security because it was issued for construction with respect
to a church, it was not distributed, the investing public would not expect a note by a
church for a bank loan to be a security, and as a large, sophisticated investor, Wachovia was not the type of investor that the securities laws generally seek to protect.
85
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swap was not a security-based swap agreement. The court did not
need to reach the latter, more difficult, question about which the
SEC and the defendants in Langford and LeCroy have disagreed.
About four years after St. Matthew’s, the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York in School District of the City
of Erie v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank considered whether a LIBOR-based
90
Butler County
“swaption” was a security-based swap agreement.
General Authority had issued bonds for the benefit of the Erie School
91
District (the “School Bonds”). The School Bonds bore interest at
92
fixed interest rates. A few years after the School Bonds were issued,
interest rates dropped, making it desirable for the school district to
93
refinance the bonds. Because of the terms of the bonds and limitations under the tax laws, however, the school district could not refinance merely by issuing new bonds and immediately repaying the

See Reves, 494 U.S. at 66–67 (indicating that a note is presumed to be a security and
describing when the presumption is rebutted).
89
The plaintiff in School District of Erie made this point. Sch. Dist. of Erie v. J.P.
Morgan Chase Bank, No. 08 CV 07688LAP, 08 CV 07982, 2009 WL 234128, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2009).
90
Id.
[I]n a swaption, one party [Party A] . . . has the right, but not
the obligation, to enter into . . . . [a] swap with the other party
[Party B] . . . at a specified fixed rate and floating rate formula,
on a specified date or during a specified period in the future.
In exchange for that right, [Party A] will pay an option premium to [Party B] on the trade date.
THE HANDBOOK OF MUNICIPAL BONDS 310 (Sylvan G. Feldstein & Frank J. Fabozzi,
eds., 2008). As explained in the School District of Erie complaint, if Party A is to receive
the floating rate under the contract, “[the swaption] is designed to give [Party A] the
benefit of the agreed upon [fixed rate] if the market rates are higher . . . ; the converse is true if the holder of the swaption receives the fixed rate under the swap
agreement.” Complaint ¶ 9, Sch. Dist. of Erie v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, No. 08 CV
07688-LP (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2009), 2008 WL 5367780 [hereinafter Erie Complaint].
91
Erie Complaint, supra note 90, ¶ 10.
92
See Brief for Plaintiffs, School District of the City of Erie and Butler County
General Authority, in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Complaint
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) at 6, Sch. Dist. of Erie v. J.P.
Morgan Chase Bank, No. 08 CV 07688 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2009), 2008 WL 5593915
[hereinafter School District Brief] (indicating that the School Bonds were fixed rate
bonds). Although the opinion and pleadings are not clear on this point, the bonds
very likely had multiple maturities and different interest rates associated with each
maturity.
93
See Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the
Complaint at 5, Sch. Dist. of Erie v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, No. 08 CIV 7688LAP
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2009), 2008 WL 5596124 [hereinafter JP Morgan Motion to Dismiss].
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94

old ones.
It could, however, achieve a similar economic result
through a “synthetic refunding” accomplished by issuing a fixed-to95
floating interest rate swaption. Accordingly, in exchange for a payment of $755,000, the Butler County General Authority, as the school
district’s agent, issued a swaption to J.P. Morgan Chase Bank (“J.P.
Morgan”) under which J.P. Morgan had the right at any time between
96
2011 and 2021 to enter into an interest rate swap with the authority.
If J.P. Morgan exercised its option, the authority would make periodic payments under the swap based on a fixed rate that had been determined in reference to the fixed interest rates on the School Bonds,
and J.P. Morgan would make periodic payments based on a floating
97
rate determined in reference to LIBOR. About five years after the
parties entered into the swaption, the school district filed a lawsuit
against J.P. Morgan, claiming violations of Exchange Act section
98
10(b) and Rule 10b-5.
The District Court dismissed the claims, finding that the
99
swaption did not constitute a security-based swap agreement. In
reaching its decision, the court looked to St. Matthew’s, suggesting
that the New Jersey District Court had held broadly that “LIBOR
100
based swaps are not security-based [swap agreements].” The court
101
also cited In re Snell & LeCroy, an SEC administrative proceeding, as
“holding . . . that even if . . . parties enter[] into an interest rate swap
agreement at the same time as [an] underlying bond transaction, the
two transactions are not a single transaction with a bond compo102
nent.”
The court confusingly indicated that, “similarly,” the fixed

94
Id. (“[A]pplicable treasury regulations restricted [the school district] from refinancing” the School Bonds immediately).
95
Id. (indicating that the school district could “benefit immediately” by entering
into the swaption). In simple terms, a “synthetic refunding” is a means by which a
borrower can achieve the economic benefit of repaying (or providing for the repayment of) outstanding bonds with proceeds from the issuance of new bonds, but
without actually taking those steps. The mechanics of, and economics underlying, a
synthetic refunding are beyond the scope of this Article. For a simple explanation,
see THE HANDBOOK OF MUNICIPAL BONDS, supra note 90, at 310–11.
96
Erie Complaint, supra note 90, ¶ 32.
97
Id. ¶ 10.
98
Id. ¶¶ 34–39.
99
Sch. Dist. of Erie v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, No. 08 CV 07688LAP, 08 CV
07982, 2009 WL 234128, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
100
Id.
101
In re Snell & LeCroy, Exchange Act Release No. 330, 2007 WL 1297008 (May 3,
2007) [hereinafter Snell & LeCroy Release] .
102
Sch. Dist. of Erie, 2009 WL 234128, at *1 (citing Snell & LeCroy Release, supra
note 101, at *32–33).
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rate in the swaption was the interest rate on the School Bonds.
Moreover, according to the court, the only material term in the swap
104
was the floating rate, which was based on LIBOR.
Therefore, like
the court in St. Matthew’s, the court in School District of Erie found that,
because LIBOR is an interest rate, a material term of the swaption
was not based “on the price, yield, value, or volatility of any security,
or any group, or index of securities” and thus was not a security-based
105
swap agreement.
The district court’s reasoning in School District of Erie is almost in106
comprehensible. It is hard to understand how the holding in Snell
& LeCroy is relevant to the School District of Erie decision. Perhaps the
court was suggesting inartfully that the Snell & LeCroy holding informs the meaning of “based on” in the security-based swap agreement definition—that, just as entering into a swap at the same time as
a related bond transaction does not create a sufficient nexus for the
swap and the bonds to be considered a single transaction, neither
does the fact that the fixed rate in the School District of Erie swaption
was determined using the fixed rates on the School Bonds mean that
the fixed rate in the swaption was “based on” the fixed rates on the
School Bonds.
If the court indeed was suggesting that Snell & LeCroy applied
analogously, this suggestion seems off the mark. Whether two separate transactions should be treated as a single transaction—which was
the issue in Snell & LeCroy—is different from whether a term in a
document is based on something else. Snell & LeCroy dealt with
whether interest rate swaps related to certain bonds could be considered “municipal securities business” and therefore subject to Munici107
pal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB) jurisdiction. Because the
MSRB had jurisdiction over municipal bond transactions, but “no jurisdiction over derivatives in the municipal market,” the transactions
needed to be collapsed if MSRB jurisdiction were to apply to the
108
swaps.
A Snell & LeCroy-styled argument in School District of Erie
103

Id.
Id.
105
Id.; see also Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 206B, 15 U.S.C. § 78c note (2006), repealed by Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 762(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1759 (2010)
(amending 15 U.S.C. § 78c note) (defining “security-based swap agreement”)
106
Understanding the court’s reasoning is very difficult because the court did not
issue an “opinion” in the case, but instead had a transcript of the proceedings prepared. See Sch. Dist. of Erie, 2009 WL 234128 (representing a transcript of proceedings).
107
Snell & LeCroy Release, supra note 101, at *32.
108
Id.
104
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would have been that the swaption and the School Bonds together
were a single transaction, and because the School Bonds are securi109
ties subject to Exchange Act section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, the
swaption also is subject to those provisions. This, however, was not
110
the plaintiffs’ argument.
In School District of Erie, the plaintiffs asserted that the swaption was subject to section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5,
not because the swaption and the School Bonds together represented
a single security, but because the swaption had a fixed rate based on
the interest rates on the School Bonds and therefore was a security111
based swap agreement.
The School District of Erie opinion and the related briefs with respect to the defendant’s motion to dismiss do not indicate exactly
how the fixed rate in the swaption related to the fixed interest rates
on the School Bonds, but it is not uncommon for the fixed rate in a
synthetic refunding swaption to equal the average interest rate on the
112
outstanding bonds.
If that was the case in School District of Erie—
and, based on the allegations in the complaint and the plaintiffs’
brief in opposition to the defendant’s motion to dismiss, it probably
was—it seems hard to argue that the fixed rate in the swaption was
not based on the interest rates on the bonds. Similar to the swap in
St. Matthew’s, the fixed interest rates on the School Bonds were more

109
There is no question that the bonds were securities. See 15 U.S.C. §§
77b(a)(1), 77c(a)(2) (2006) (including “bond” in the definition of “security” and
specifying that a “security issued . . . by any political subdivision of a State . . ., or by
any public instrumentality of one or more States” is an exempted security); id. §
78c(a)(10) (including “bond” in the definition of “security”); id. § 78c(a)(12)(A)(ii),
(a)(29) (defining “securities which are direct obligations of . . . a State or any political subdivision thereof, or any agency or instrumentality of a State or any political
subdivision thereof” as exempted securities); Erie Complaint, supra note 90, ¶ 2 (stating that the Butler County General Authority, the issuer of the bonds, “is a public
instrumentality and body corporate and politic in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania”).
110
In fact, the argument would not have made sense in Erie because the bonds
were issued two or more years before the swaption. See Erie Complaint, supra note 90,
¶¶ 8, 40 (indicating that the swaps were entered into in 2003 and the bonds were
denominated as a 2000 series).
111
See School District Brief, supra note 92, at 6 (noting that one of the material
terms of the swaption was “the fixed rate of the School [Bonds]”).
112
THE HANDBOOK OF MUNICIPAL BONDS, supra note 90, at 310. DEC Associates,
Inc. (“DEC”), a swap advisor that assisted the County of Dare, North Carolina, in
2005, described a swaption with UBS structured in this way. DEC ASSOCS., INC., CNTY.
DARE,
N.C.,
PRELIMINARY
SWAP
ANALYSIS
(2005),
available
at
OF
http://www.darenc.com/BOC/2005/Attachments/0516at6.pdf. According to DEC,
in the UBS swaption structure, “[i]f UBS exercise[d] the option, . . . the County
[would] pay UBS a fixed swap rate equal to the average coupon of the [debt to be
refinanced].” Id.
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than a fundamental part of determining the fixed rate under the
swaption. Therefore, applying Rorech’s interpretation, a term of the
swaption—its fixed rate—was based on the interest rate of a security.
Even more perplexing than School District of Erie’s reference to
Snell & LeCroy is the court’s statement that the “only material term”
under the swaption was the floating rate, which was based on
113
It is hard to imagine an interest rate swap—or any other
LIBOR.
contract for that matter—with a single material term. At a minimum,
a floating-to-fixed interest rate swap has three material terms: the
floating rate, the fixed rate, and the notional amount. Without all
three, there is no swap.
The only real issue in School District of Erie—and the one the
court ignored—was whether the fact that the fixed rate in the
swaption was determined from the fixed rates on the School Bonds
meant that either the floating rate or fixed rate in the swaption was
based on the price, yield, value or volatility of an interest in the
School Bonds. The School District of Erie swaption otherwise met the
114
definition of “security-based swap agreement.”
The plaintiffs in School District of Erie tried to help the court distinguish the School District of Erie swaption from the swap at issue in St.
Matthew’s by pointing out that the floating rate in the St. Matthew’s
swap was the same as the interest rate in a note, which was not a security, and that the fixed rate in the School District of Erie swaption was
determined from the fixed rates on the School Bonds, which were se113
Sch. Dist. of Erie v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, No. 08 CV 07688LAP, 08 CV
07982, 2009 WL 234128, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
114
The swaption was a swap agreement because it was an option on an interest rate
swap, which specifically is included in the GLBA § 206A definition. See GrammLeach-Bliley Act §§ 206A(a)(3), 206(a)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 78c note (2006) (including
an interest rate swap in paragraph (3) and providing that an option on an agreement, contract or transaction described in paragraph (3) is included in the definition of “swap agreement”). The court in School District of Erie did not address this
point, but the defendant admitted as much. JP Morgan Motion to Dismiss, supra
note 93, at 7. Because the fixed rate in the swaption most likely represented the average fixed interest rate on the School Bonds, the swaption’s fixed rate easily could
be considered based on the School Bonds, which were securities. See supra note 112
and accompanying text (describing how the swaption may have been structured);
supra note 109 (indicating that municipal bonds are securities). The fixed rate under the swaption was material because, in Rorech terms, it “was plainly part of, if not all
of, the consideration for which” J.P. Morgan agreed to make LIBOR-based floating
rate payments. SEC v. Rorech, 720 F. Supp. 2d 367, 408 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). Moreover,
it was the rate on which J.P. Morgan would base its decision as to whether to exercise
the swaption. If market rates stayed below the fixed rate in the swaption, J.P. Morgan
would exercise the swaption so that it would receive the higher fixed rate. If market
rates rose above the fixed rate in the swaption, J.P. Morgan would not exercise it,
benefiting instead from the higher market rates.
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115

curities.
The School District of Erie court did not attach any significance to this distinction, however, and relied instead—with what appears to be little thought—on the fact that the St. Matthew’s “[c]ourt’s
analysis went exclusively to the LIBOR rate and said nothing about
116
the underlying.”
Because the St. Matthew’s swap was floating-tofixed and the floating rate corresponded to the interest rate under
the note, the court in that case appropriately focused on the LIBORbased floating rate. In contrast, the School District of Erie court should
have focused on the fixed rate under the swaption because it related
to the interest rates on the School Bonds. By failing to do so, the
School District of Erie court missed the real issue.
3.

Caiola, Elliott, Wyly, and Goldman Sachs

The United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York was the first court to give the term “security-based swap
agreement” any specific attention, but the attention it gave was not
terribly meaningful. In Caiola v. Citibank, N.A., the court considered
a private cause of action under Exchange Act section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 with respect to, among other things, equity swaps entered into
117
prior to the enactment of the CFMA. The Caiola equity swaps consisted of agreements under which Louis Caiola, the plaintiff, agreed
to pay to Citibank “interest” on a notional amount representing the
price of a specified number of shares of Philip Morris stock, plus the
amount of any losses resulting from decreases in the price of the
118
stock.
In exchange, Citibank agreed to pay Caiola the amount of
any dividends paid on the Philip Morris shares, plus the amount of
119
any gains resulting from increases in the price of the stock.

115

School District Brief, supra note 92, at 6.
Sch. Dist. of Erie, 2009 WL 234128, at *1.
117
Caiola v. Citibank, N.A., 137 F. Supp. 2d 362, 365 n.1, 366–67, 372 (S.D.N.Y.
2001).
118
Caiola v. Citibank, N.A., 295 F.3d 312, 316 (2d Cir. 2002).
119
Id. The Second Circuit gave the following example of how the Caiola equity
swaps worked:
[I]f Caiola synthetically purchased 1000 shares of Philip Morris at $50
per share, the notional value of that transaction would be $50,000. Because this notional value would resemble a loan from Citibank, Caiola
would pay interest at a predetermined rate on the $50,000. If Philip
Morris’s stock price fell $10, Caiola would pay Citibank $10,000. If the
stock price rose $10, Citibank would pay Caiola $10,000. Citibank also
would pay Caiola the value of any dividends that Caiola would have received had he actually owned 1000 physical shares.
Id.
116
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The District Court discussed the CFMA amendments to section
10(b) and stated, without any analysis, that the equity swaps “indisputably” would have been subject to section 10(b), as amended, had
120
they been entered after the CFMA was enacted. In an appeal of the
dismissal of the case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, also without analysis, similarly indicated that, “had
Caiola entered into his [equity swaps] after the enactment of the
121
CFMA, they clearly would [have been] covered under Rule 10b-5.”
Although the district court and the Second Circuit in Caiola
merely stated conclusions without any analysis, their conclusions that
the equity swaps at issue in the case were security-based swap agreements were undoubtedly correct. GLBA section 206A specifically in122
cludes equity swaps in the definition of swap agreement. The Caiola
swaps provided that payments were to be exchanged as a result of
123
changes in the price of Philip Morris stock.
Therefore, a term of
124
each swap related to a price and the price was of traditional stock—a
125
security.
The relationship between the term and the price of the
stock was direct. If the price of Philip Morris stock went up or down,
payments equal to the entire amount of the increase or decrease multiplied by the notional amount were due. Price did not merely represent a fundamental part of the term; the term had no meaning without price. If the phrase “based on” in the definition of “security-based
swap agreement” does not include such a close relationship, it is hard
120

Caiola, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 371.
Caiola, 295 F.3d at 327.
122
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 206A(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 78c note (2006). Under
GLBA section 206A(a), the agreement must be “between eligible contract participants” and “the material terms of [the agreement] (other than price and quantity)
[must be] subject to individual negotiation.” Id. § 206A(a). Citibank was, and Caiola
almost assuredly was also, an eligible contract participant.
See 7 U.S.C. §
1a(12)(A)(i), (xi) (2006) (including in the definition of “eligible contract participant” financial institutions and individuals with total assets in excess of $10 million);
see also supra note 32 (discussing the definition of “eligible contract participant”).
The Second Circuit described Caiola as a “sophisticated investor” and “a major client
of Citibank Private Bank.” Caiola, 295 F.3d at 315. Moreover, Caiola and Citibank
assuredly negotiated the terms of the equity swaps. See id. at 317–18 (describing the
master agreement and trade confirmations Caiola and Citibank executed).
123
See Caiola, 295 F.3d at 316.
124
The equity swaps also provided that Citibank would pay to Caiola the amount
of any dividends paid on Philip Morris shares. Id. Because the swaps required payments determined in reference to changes in price, one need not determine whether the term requiring the payment of dividends is based on price, yield, value, or volatility for purposes of the definition of security-based swap agreement.
125
See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2006) (including “stock” in the definition of “security”); id. § 78c(a)(10) (same); Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 687
(1985) (concluding that traditional stock clearly is a security).
121
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to imagine that any relationship could satisfy the definition. Finally,
the term represented a significant portion of the consideration under
the agreement and therefore was material.
In Elliott Associates v. Porsche Automobil Holding SE, the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York considered
whether swaps that referenced Volkswagen’s stock, which is listed on
a German stock exchange, were subject to Exchange Act section
126
10(b) and Rule 10b-5. The swaps in Elliott were similar to the equity
swaps in Caiola—in that they required the plaintiffs to make payments
to the swap counterparties when Volkswagen’s stock price rose and
required the counterparties to make payments to the plaintiffs when
127
Volkswagen’s stock price fell.
The issue in the case, however, was
not whether the swaps were security-based swap agreements—the
court, without discussion, referred to them as such—but whether section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 applied to a security-based swap agreement
128
with respect to a security listed on a foreign exchange. Looking to
the Supreme Court’s decision in Morrison v. National Australia Bank
129
Ltd., the district court determined that section 10(b) and Rule 10b130
5 did not apply.
SEC v. Wyly involved allegations of illegal insider trading under
Exchange Act section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 with respect to a swap in
which five companies were to receive gains from, and pay losses on,
131
two million shares of Sterling Software, Inc. stock. In its complaint,
132
the SEC described the swap as a “security-based swap agreement.”
The swap, however, was entered into prior to enactment of the
CFMA, a point that the defendants raised in moving for dismissal of
133
the insider trading claims.
Accordingly, in ruling on the defendants’ motion, the court did not consider whether the swap fit the
CFMA definition.
Finally, in SEC v. Goldman Sachs & Co., the SEC claimed violations of Securities Act section 17(a) and Exchange Act section 10(b)
126

759 F. Supp. 2d 469, 470 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant Porsche Automobil Holding
SE’s Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) or on the Basis of Forum Non
Conveniens at 8, Elliott Assocs. v. Porsche Auto. Holding SE, 759 F. Supp. 2d 469
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (Nos. 10 Civ. 0532 (HB), 10 Civ. 4155 (HB)).
128
Elliott Assocs., 759 F. Supp. 2d at 475.
129
130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010).
130
Elliott Assocs., 759 F. Supp. 2d at 476.
131
788 F. Supp. 2d 92, 97 n.37 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
132
Complaint ¶ 77, SEC v. Wyly, 788 F. Supp. 2d 92 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 10 Civ.
5760), 2010 WL 3133915.
133
Wyly, 788 F. Supp. 2d 92 at 120.
127
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and Rule 10b-5 with respect to CDSs related to a synthetic collateral134
ized debt obligation known as ABACUS 2007-AC-1.
The SEC’s
complaint alleged that the swaps were security-based swap agreements, and while the defendant did not “concede that the SEC’s
135
characterization . . . [was] correct,” he did not argue the point in
136
his motion to dismiss. Therefore, the court’s opinion regarding the
defendant’s motion does not address whether the swaps were in fact
security-based swap agreements.
The Elliott, Wyly, and Goldman Sachs opinions are short on details
as to the actual mechanics of the swaps at issue in those cases. Nevertheless, it seems very likely that the swaps in those cases would meet
the definition of security-based swap agreement. With payments being exchanged based on gains and losses with respect to Volkswagen
and Sterling Software stock, the swaps in Elliott and Wyly were similar
to those at issue in Caiola and likely would be security-based swap
agreements for the same reasons as the Caiola swaps were. Similarly,
the Goldman Sachs CDSs almost certainly were priced taking into account securities associated with ABACUS and therefore were likely
security-based swap agreements for the reasons cited in Rorech.
III. LANGFORD AND LECROY
Rorech was the first substantive opinion regarding SEC enforcement of a security-based swap agreement, but the SEC’s first enforcement action with respect to an alleged security-based swap
agreement was filed two years earlier, in April 2008, against Larry
Langford, the then-mayor of Birmingham, Alabama and former president of the Jefferson County, Alabama, commission; Blount Parrish
& Co., Inc., a Montgomery, Alabama, broker-dealer; William Blount,
134

SEC v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 790 F. Supp. 2d 147, 147 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
[CDOs] are debt securities collateralized by debt obligations, including
[RMBSs]. These securities are packaged and generally held by a special purpose vehicle that issues notes entitling their holders to payments derived from the underlying assets. In a synthetic CDO, the special purpose vehicle does not own a portfolio of [RMBSs], but enters
into credit default swaps . . . that reference the performance of the
portfolio.
Id. at 150 n.2. For further discussion of how CDOs work, see In re Sec. Capital Assurance, Ltd. Sec. Litig., 729 F. Supp. 2d 569, 574–76 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
135
Reply Memorandum of Law of Fabrice Tourre in Support of His Motion to
Dismiss the Amended Complaint at 8 n.11, SEC v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 790 F.
Supp. 2d 147 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 10-cv-3229), 2011 WL 1291012.
136
See generally Memorandum of Law of Fabrice Tourre in Further Support of His
Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint at 8 n.11, SEC v. Goldman Sachs & Co.,
790 F. Supp. 2d 147 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 10-cv-3229), 2010 WL 5889174.
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a co-owner of Blount Parrish; and Albert LaPierre, an Alabama lobby137
ist.
In SEC v. Langford, the SEC alleged that Langford, Blount,
Blount Parrish, and LaPierre violated Securities Act section 17(a) and
Exchange Act section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 in connection with four
interest rate swaps (valued at approximately $3.5 billion in total) entered into by Jefferson County with respect to various series of bonds
138
issued by the county. In 2009, the SEC initiated a related enforcement action against Charles LeCroy and Douglas MacFaddin, both of
139
whom were managing directors of J.P. Morgan Securities, Inc.
In
SEC v. LeCroy, the SEC claimed violations of Securities Act section
17(a) and Exchange Act section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 with respect to
the three interest rate swaps (valued at approximately $2 billion in total) at issue in Langford that had been entered into between the county and JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., a commercial bank affiliated with
140
J.P. Morgan Securities.
All of the interest rate swaps at issue in Langford and LeCroy provided that one of the parties would make floating rate payments determined in reference to the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association’s (SIFMA) Municipal Swap Index (“the SIFMA
141
Index”).
The SEC alleged in the Langford and LeCroy complaints
137
See Langford Complaint, supra note 20; see also Langford Release, supra note 19
(“The case is the SEC’s first enforcement action involving security-based swap
agreements.”).
138
Langford Complaint, supra note 20, ¶¶ 1–5, 11–12. The various series of
“bonds” that the SEC refers to in its complaint technically are denominated “warrants.” See, e.g., JEFFERSON CNTY, OFFICIAL STATEMENT REGARDING $1,155,765,000
JEFFERSON COUNTY, ALABAMA, SEWER REVENUE REFUNDING WARRANTS, SERIES 2003-B
(2003),
available
at
http://jeffco.jccal.org/pls/portal/docs/PAGE/FINANCE_PAGE_GROUP/
INVESTOR_RELATIONS/TAB60915/2003-B%20OFFICIAL%20STATEMENT.PDF.
In the SEC’s related enforcement action against Charles LeCroy and Douglas
MacFaddin, MacFaddin’s motion to dismiss appropriately referred to the Jefferson
County “bonds” as “warrants.” Defendant Douglas W. MacFaddin’s Motion to Dismiss at 5, SEC v. LeCroy, No. 2:09-cv-02238 (N.D. Ala. Jan. 15, 2010) [hereinafter
MacFaddin Motion to Dismiss]. The SEC presumably referred to the “warrants” as
“bonds” because the warrants would have had to have met the definition of “State or
local bond” under the Internal Revenue Code in order to be tax exempt. See 26
U.S.C. § 103 (2006) (excluding interest on state and local bonds from gross income).
Consistent with the SEC’s nomenclature, this Article also refers to the “warrants” as
“bonds.”
139
SEC Charges Two Former Directors of J.P. Morgan Securities with Fraud in
Connection with Unlawful Payment Scheme to Obtain Municipal Bond and Swap
Business, Litigation Release No. 21280, 2009 WL 3631040 (Nov. 4, 2009).
140
LeCroy Complaint, supra note 21, ¶¶ 2, 5.
141
Langford Complaint, supra note 20, ¶ 16; LeCroy Complaint, supra note 21, ¶¶
18–19. When the swaps were entered into, the index was called The Bond Market
Association Municipal Swap Index (the “BMA Index”). See id. ¶ 16 (referring to the
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that the swaps were security-based swap agreements because the floating rate payments were based “on the value” of the SIFMA Index and
the SIFMA Index is an index of securities that was “used to establish
142
the floating rate yield.”
The defendants disagreed with the SEC’s
characterization of the swaps and filed motions to dismiss the SEC’s
claims.
No decision will be forthcoming in Langford as to whether the
SIFMA Index swaps were security-based swap agreements. The SEC’s
enforcement actions against Blount, Blount Parrish & Co., Inc., and
143
LaPierre were resolved by consent judgments in July 2010.
In
March 2011, without issuing an opinion, the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Alabama denied Langford’s mo144
tion to dismiss, and in August 2011, the court granted summary
judgment against Langford in the SEC’s enforcement action without
a determination as to whether the Jefferson County swaps were secu145
rity-based swap agreements.
BMA Index); LeCroy Complaint, supra note 21, ¶¶ 18–19 (same); Answering Your Questions About the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA) Municipal
Swap
Index,
SIFMA
(Nov.
1,
2010),
http://www.sifma.org/research/item.aspx?id=1690 [hereinafter About SIFMA] (indicating that the SIFMA Index formerly was referred to as the BMA Index). SIFMA is
the successor to the Bond Market Association. Id.
142
Langford Complaint, supra note 20, ¶ 16; LeCroy Complaint, supra note 21, ¶
18–19.
143
SEC v. Langford, No. 2:08-cv-00761-AKK (N.D. Ala. July 14, 2010) (order granting final judgment and permanent injunction as to Albert W. LaPierre); SEC v. Langford, No. 2:08-cv-00761-AKK (N.D. Ala. July 14, 2010) (order granting final judgment
and permanent injunction as to William B. Blount); SEC v. Langford, No. 2:08-cv00761-AKK (N.D. Ala. July 14, 2010)(order granting final judgment and permanent
injunction as to Blount Parish & Co., Inc.).
144
SEC v. Langford, No. 2:08-cv-00761-AKK (N.D. Ala. March 30, 2011) (order
denying motion to dismiss).
145
SEC v. Langford, No. 2:08-cv-761-AKK (N.D. Ala. Aug. 8, 2011). In March
2010, Langford was convicted on sixty-one counts of bribery, conspiracy, money
laundering, mail fraud, wire fraud, filing false personal income tax returns, and criminal forfeiture. See United States v. Langford, 647 F.3d 1309, 1314, 1319 (11th Cir.
2011); Sherrel Stewart, Former Birmingham Mayor Larry Langford Reports to Federal Prison
in
Kentucky,
BIRMINGHAM
NEWS
(Apr.
7,
2010,
11:30
AM),
http://blog.al.com/spotnews/2010/04/former_birmingham_mayor_larry_4.html.
The SEC’s claims in Langford included not only fraud claims with respect to the
swaps, but also fraud claims with respect to the related bonds. Langford Complaint,
supra note 20, ¶¶ 11, 14. In its summary judgment motion, the SEC argued that
Langford’s conviction estopped him from disputing the allegations in the SEC’s enforcement action and that the resolution of whether the swaps were security-based
swap agreements was unnecessary because there was no dispute that the activities
complained of were in connection with bonds, “which are undeniably securities,”
subject to Securities Act section 17(a) and Exchange Act section 10(b) and Rule 10b5. Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment Against Defendant Larry P. Langford at
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In LeCroy, the District Court denied LeCroy’s and MacFaddin’s
motions to dismiss on procedural grounds without reaching a conclusion as to whether the relevant Jefferson County swaps were security146
based swap agreements.
An answer to the question remains possible in that case.
A. Arguments of the Defendants and SIFMA
In support of their motions to dismiss, the defendants in Langford and LeCroy argued that the Jefferson County swaps were not security-based swap agreements for two reasons. First, the SIFMA Index is
147
Second,
not an index of securities, but an index of interest rates.
even if the SIFMA Index were an index of securities, no material term
of any of the swaps was based on “the price, yield, value or volatility”
148
of the SIFMA Index.
SIFMA made the same arguments in an amicus curiae brief that
149
it filed in Langford. In the brief, SIFMA explained how the SIFMA
Index works. According to SIFMA, the SIFMA Index is calculated
based on interest rates from over 600 tax-exempt variable rate demand obligations (VRDOs) whose rates are adjusted each week to re150
flect existing market conditions.
SIFMA noted that the database
1–2, 9, 14 n.3, SEC v. Langford, No. 2:08-cv-00761-AKK (N.D. Ala. July 16, 2010);
Plaintiff’s Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment Against Defendant Larry P.
Langford, SEC v. Langford, No. 2:08-cv-00761-AKK (N.D. Ala. Aug. 8, 2011).
146
See SEC v. LeCroy, No. 2:09-cv-02238, slip op. at 2 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 4, 2010)
(denying the defendants’ motions and noting that the question of whether the Jefferson County swaps were security-based swap agreements was one that “[the] court
[could not] resolve . . . on a motion to dismiss”).
147
See Motion to Dismiss of William B. Blount and Blount Parrish & Co., Inc. at
11–14, SEC v. Langford, No. 2:08-cv-00761-AKK (N.D. Ala. June 27, 2008) [hereinafter Blount Motion to Dismiss]; Motion of Charles LeCroy to Dismiss Complaint at 8–
11, Securities Exchange Commission v. LeCroy, No. 2:09-cv-02238 (N.D. Ala. Jan. 19,
2010) [hereinafter LeCroy Motion to Dismiss]; MacFaddin Motion to Dismiss, supra
note 138, at 13–18. Langford and LaPierre filed motions to dismiss that incorporated the motion to dismiss of Blount and Blount Parrish. Motion to Dismiss of Albert W. LaPierre, SEC v. Langford, No. 2:08-cv-00761-AKK (N.D. Ala. June 30, 2008);
Motion to Dismiss of Larry P. Langford, Securities and Exchange Commission v.
Langford, No. 2:08-cv-00761-AKK (N.D. Ala. June 30, 2008).
148
See Blount Motion to Dismiss, supra note 147, at 14–15; LeCroy Motion to Dismiss, supra note 147, at 7–8; MacFaddin Motion to Dismiss, supra note 138, at 18–22.
149
See Brief for Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Defendants at 14–25, SEC v. Langford, No. 2:08-cv-00761-AKK
(N.D. Ala. Aug. 7, 2008) [hereinafter SIFMA Brief].
150
Id. at 9. “[VRDOs] are financial instruments whose yield is reset [by a remarketing agent] on a regular basis, such as daily, weekly, monthly or even semiannually[,] . . . to bring it in line with the broader interest rate market.” THE
HANDBOOK OF MUNICIPAL BONDS, supra note 90, at 1129–30. VRDOs typically allow an
investor to tender its security on each reset date at a price equal to par plus accrued
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used to calculate the index is controlled by Municipal Market Data
(MMD), that the identities of the specific VRDOs used to calculate
the index are not known to SIFMA, and that the VRDOs used in the
151
index change from week to week.
SIFMA also indicated that only
interest rates are used to calculate the index and that “[o]ther terms
152
of the [VRDOs] . . . are not reported as part of the [index].”
SIFMA asserted that, accordingly, the SIFMA Index is intended to be
153
a “benchmark interest rate.”
To support its claim that the SIFMA Index is an index of interest
rates, not securities, SIFMA cited the fact that SIFMA Index swaps are
154
used to hedge against interest rate fluctuations. Moreover, according to SIFMA, the SIFMA Index “is well understood in the marketplace . . . [as] the tax-exempt market equivalent of LIBOR, which is
155
an index of . . . interest rates.”
Referring to the conclusion in St.
Matthew’s that LIBOR-based swaps are not security-based swap agreements, SIFMA argued that it would be inconsistent to determine that
a SIFMA Index swap is a security-based swap agreement when its most
common alternative—a LIBOR swap—is not a security-based swap
156
agreement. SIFMA acknowledged that the VRDOs used to calculate
the SIFMA Index are securities, but asserted that the use of VRDOs
for the calculation does not mean that the index is an index of secu157
rities. According to SIFMA, the only reason that the interest rates

interest, and the remarketing agent sets each rate so that tendered obligations may
be resold at par. Id. at 1130; ROBERT A FIPPINGER, THE SECURITIES LAW OF PUBLIC
FINANCE § 5:3.4[B] (2d ed. 2010).
151
SIFMA Brief, supra note 149, at 10.
152
Id.
153
Id. at 22. MacFaddin argued that the fact that no other terms of the VRDOs
are involved in calculating the SIFMA Index indicates that the SIFMA Index solely is
a “benchmark interest rate.” MacFaddin Motion to Dismiss, supra note 138, at 14.
154
SIFMA Brief, supra note 149, at 20.
155
Id. at 8. In his reply brief to the SEC’s response to his motion to dismiss,
MacFaddin clarified that “LIBOR is not ‘based on’ a bank lending rate, [but] is a
bank lending rate . . . ‘based on’ the interest rates on loans made between banks.”
Defendant Douglas W. MacFaddin’s Reply in Further Support of His Motion to Dismiss at 12 n.10, SEC v. LeCroy, No. 2:09-cv-02238 (N.D. Ala. Feb. 17, 2010) [hereinafter MacFaddin Reply].
156
SIFMA Brief, supra note 149, at 22. MacFaddin made a similar claim. See
MacFaddin Motion to Dismiss, supra note 138, at 16–18 (arguing that the SIFMA Index is an alternative to LIBOR and that treating the two differently would be inappropriate).
157
SIFMA Brief, supra note 149, at 19; see also Reply Brief of the Securities Industry
and Financial Markets Association in Support of its Motion for Leave to File a Brief
Amicus Curiae at 8, SEC v. Langford, No. 2:08-cv-00761-AKK (N.D. Ala. Jan. 19,
2010) [hereinafter SIFMA Reply].
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used in the SIFMA Index are those from securities is that tax-exempt
158
interest rates apply only to municipal bonds, which are securities.
In arguing that no material term of any of the swaps was based
on the value or yield of the SIFMA Index, SIFMA asserted that the
swaps could not be based on the value of the index because the index
159
does not include values but interest rates.
MacFaddin added that
characterizing the SIFMA Index as the value of the underlying securities is inconsistent with the distinction between “value” and “level” in
160
the definition of “swap agreement.”
The term “level,” MacFaddin
argued, applies to interest rates, while the term “value” applies to true
indexes of securities, which measure the performance of the securi161
ties in the index.
SIFMA, Blount, and MacFaddin all contended
that the SIFMA Index does not represent a yield because, to calculate
yield on a debt instrument, one must have not only the interest rate,
but also the purchase price, the rate at which interest accrues, and
162
the holding period. MacFaddin noted that an “[i]nterest rate is an
express term of a bond (like principal amount and maturity date),
while yield is not. Yield is a mathematical calculation using components that reflect market conditions and other factors (including the
163
interest rate).”
In addition to their specific arguments, SIFMA, Blount, and
MacFaddin argued broadly that Congress did not intend the term security-based swap agreement to include interest rate swaps. SIFMA
contended that, because of pre-CFMA case law that held that the securities laws did not apply to interest rate swaps, for the term “security-based swap agreement” to include interest rate swaps, Congress
164
needed to state so explicitly. Blount observed that, under the definition adopted by the International Swaps and Derivatives Association
(ISDA) and incorporated by reference in the Jefferson County swap
documents, the SIFMA Index means “the index which is issued weekly and is compiled from the weekly interest rate resets of tax-exempt vari158
SIFMA Reply, supra note 157, at 8. MacFaddin made a similar argument. See
MacFaddin Reply, supra note 155, at 12 (“The interest rates used in the SIFMA Index
are derived from securities for the sole purpose of capturing a tax exempt rate. Interest is only tax exempt if it accrues on a municipal bond.” (citations omitted)).
159
SIFMA Brief, supra note 149, at 23.
160
MacFaddin Motion to Dismiss, supra note 139, at 19.
161
Id. at 20.
162
SIFMA Brief, supra note 149, at 24; see Blount Motion to Dismiss, supra note
147, at 15 (citing the definition of yield used by the Municipal Securities Rulemaking
Board); MacFaddin Motion to Dismiss, supra note 138, at 20-–21.
163
MacFaddin Motion to Dismiss, supra note 138, at 21.
164
SIFMA Brief, supra note 149, at 21.
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able rate issues included in a database maintained by Municipal Mar165
ket Data.”
According to Blount, then, for the Jefferson County
swaps to be security-based swap agreements, the definition of “security-based swap agreement” would need to be expanded to include not
only “an index of securities,” but also “an index of the rates of underly166
ing securities.” MacFaddin likewise claimed that, for SIFMA Index
swaps to be subject to Securities Act section 17(a) and Exchange Act
section 10(b), one would need to interpret “index of securities” to
167
mean “index of interest rates extracted from a group of securities.”
Moreover, MacFaddin maintained that the definition of “swap
agreement” in GLBA section 206A separately states that there may be
agreements based on “interest or other rates” and agreements based
on “securities” or “instruments of indebtedness,” and, in light of that,
the only reasonable interpretation is that the term “security-based
168
swap agreement” applies only to the latter.
B. Counterarguments of the SEC
In responding to the defendants’ motions to dismiss and
SIFMA’s amicus brief, the SEC argued primarily that, procedurally,
the defendants had not met the legal standard required for dismis169
sal.
The SEC did, however, raise some substantive arguments. In
Langford, the SEC argued that both the ISDA definition and the description of the SIFMA Index on SIFMA’s website indicate that the
170
SIFMA Index is an index of securities. The SEC focused on the fact
that the rate identified in the ISDA definition references “an underly171
ing index of ‘tax exempt variable rate issues’” and that the SIFMA web165

Blount Motion to Dismiss, supra note 147, at 12 (quoting ISDA, SUPPLEMENT
NUMBER 19 TO THE 2000 ISDA DEFINITIONS AND ANNEX TO THE 2000 ISDA DEFINITIONS
(2004) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted), available at
http://www.isda.org/publications/pdf/supplement-19-to-2000DefinitionsAnnex.pdf.
166
Id. at 13 (emphasis added).
167
MacFaddin Motion to Dismiss, supra note 138, at 15; see also MacFaddin Reply,
supra note 155, at 12 (making a similar argument).
168
MacFaddin Motion to Dismiss, supra note 138, at 12.
169
See Plaintiff’s Response to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 38–46, SEC v.
Langford, No. 2:08-cv-00761-AKK (N.D. Ala. July 14, 2008) [hereinafter SEC Response to Blount] (describing the SEC’s procedural arguments against dismissal);
Plaintiff’s Consolidated Response to Motions to Dismiss of Defendants Charles
LeCroy and Douglas MacFaddin at 10–21, SEC v. LeCroy, No. 2:09-cv-02238 (N.D.
Ala. Feb. 9, 2010) [hereinafter SEC Response to LeCroy] (same); Plaintiff’s Response
to the Brief of the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association at 12–18,
SEC v. Langford, No. 2:08-cv-00761-AKK (N.D. Ala. August 27, 2008) [hereinafter
SEC Response to SIFMA] (same).
170
SEC Response to Blount, supra note 169, at 47–49.
171
Id. at 47.
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site describes the SIFMA Index as one consisting of VRDOs, which,
172
the SEC noted, are bonds and “obviously securities.”
In LeCroy, the SEC refined and expanded its argument. Similar
to its approach in Langford, the SEC argued that “there is no doubt
the interest rates used to calculate the [SIFMA] Index are interest
173
rates on a group or index of bonds, which are securities.” The SEC
went further, however, and claimed that the interest rates on the
VRDOs relevant to the SIFMA Index are the same as their yields because one of the key features of a VRDO is the ability of the holders
174
to tender the obligations at par.
The SEC noted that, as a result,
many “experts” use the terms “interest rate” and “yield” interchange175
ably when discussing VRDOs. The SEC also argued that the interest
rates on the VRDOs are closely related to the value and volatility of
the underlying obligations because the rates on the obligations are
determined based on comparable securities, credit ratings, and supply and demand, and because SIFMA controls the variation of interest rates in the index by eliminating obligations with interest rates
176
that are outliers. According to the SEC, this was evidence that the
SIFMA Index is based on an “interest” in the value or volatility of a
177
“group of securities.”
C. The Statutory Text Supports the Conclusion that a SIFMA Index
Swap Is a Security-Based Swap Agreement, but Policy Does Not
The SEC’s arguments in Langford and LeCroy as to why the Jefferson County swaps were security-based swap agreements are not particularly well developed. Nevertheless, under a fair reading of the
statute and in light of the flexibility apparently intended by Congress,
the SEC’s claim is not unfounded.
Of course, trying to divine what Congress intended to capture in
the definition of the term “security-based swap agreement” is difficult
in light of the scant legislative history with respect to the term. What
172
Id. at 48 n.13; see SEC Response to SIFMA, supra note 169, at 20 (“[T]he interest rates [in the SIFMA Index] are on bonds, which are undisputedly securities.”).
173
SEC Response to SIFMA, supra note 169, at 22; SEC Response to LeCroy, supra
note 169, at 22.
174
SEC Response to SIFMA, supra note 169, at 22–23; SEC Response to LeCroy,
supra note 169, at 23–24.
175
SEC Response to SIFMA, supra note 169, at 24; SEC Response to LeCroy, supra
note 169, at 24.
176
SEC Response to SIFMA, supra note 169, at 25–26; SEC Response to LeCroy,
supra note 169, at 25–26.
177
SEC Response to SIFMA, supra note 169, at 26; SEC Response to LeCroy, supra
note 169, at 26.
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little can be gleaned from the legislative history, however, is that
Congress wanted the term to sweep broadly to cover wrongdoing,
178
particularly with respect to innovations in the swap market. In light
of that intent, a narrow interpretation of the term seems unsuitable.
When analyzed based on its component parts, and taking into
account Rorech’s common-sense interpretation of the meaning of
“based on,” the definition of security-based swap agreement can rea179
sonably be construed to include a SIFMA Index swap.
First, a
SIFMA Index swap is an interest rate swap, and an interest rate swap
clearly is a swap agreement within the meaning of GLBA section 206A.
As discussed above with respect to St. Matthew’s and School District of
Erie, interest rate swaps are specifically included in GLBA section
180
206A(a)(3). Second, the SIFMA Index can reasonably be said to be
based on price. The floating rate in a SIFMA Index swap is not based
on the SIFMA Index; it is the SIFMA Index. Therefore, in determining whether a SIFMA Index swap is a security-based swap agreement,
one needs to determine whether the SIFMA Index itself is based on a
price, yield, value, or volatility. SIFMA indicates that the interest rates
used in the SIFMA Index are from VRDOs whose rates are adjusted
178

See, e.g., 146 CONG. REC. 27,309 (2000) (statement of Sen. Sarbanes) (“Title III
[of the CFMA] applies anti-fraud and anti-manipulation provisions of the Federal
Securities law to securities-based swap agreements . . . . This will enhance protection
for investors and for the financial markets, and will permit the SEC to respond as
necessary to developments in these markets.”); 146 CONG. REC. 27,078 (2000) (statement of Rep. Dingell) (“One of the most important provisions of the [CFMA] . . .
gives the SEC antifraud authority over securities-based swap agreements . . . . This
permits the SEC to use its tested methods to enhance the protection in [the swap]
markets and to respond as necessary to developments in the future.”).
179
See supra Part II.B (describing the component parts of the definition of “security-based swap agreement”).
180
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 206A(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 78c note (2006); see supra
notes 85, 114 and accompanying text (noting that the St. Matthew’s and School District
of Erie interest rate swaps were swap agreements under GLBA section 206A). Of
course, prior to Dodd-Frank, for an interest rate swap to be a swap agreement under
GLBA section 206A, it must have been between eligible contract participants, and
the material terms (other than price and quantity) must have been subject to individual negotiation. See supra note 31 and accompanying text (quoting a portion of
the definition of “swap agreement”). In the case of the Jefferson County swaps, these
requirements were met. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., Bear Stearns & Co., and Jefferson County, Alabama, were all “eligible contract participants” under section
1a(12) of the CEA. See 7 U.S.C. § 1a(12)(A)(i), (A)(v), (A)(vi) (2006) (including
financial institutions, corporations with assets exceeding $10 million, and political
subdivisions and instrumentalities of governmental entities owning or investing on a
discretionary basis investments of $25 million or more). In addition, as “negotiated
swaps,” the material terms of the Jefferson County swaps certainly were subject to individual negotiation. Bear Stearns & Co. was the counterparty to the one Jefferson
County swap that was at issue in Langford, but not in LeCroy. See Langford Complaint,
supra note 20, ¶ 12.
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181

weekly.
The rate on each of those VRDOs is adjusted to the rate
182
that is required to allow the obligation to be sold at a price of par. If
Rorech is correct—that, for a matter to be “based on” a particular factor, that factor must represent a fundamental part of the matter—the
interest rates on the VRDOs are based on their prices. There are other
factors involved in determining the rates, but the par price is fundamental. Without it, one could not determine the rate. Third, the
SIFMA Index is determined from a group of securities. Neither SIFMA
nor the defendants disputed that the SIFMA Index is calculated from
interest rates on over 600 VRDOs or that those VRDOs are securities.
Finally, the floating rate in a SIFMA Index swap is a material term. It,
along with the notional amount, determines the consideration for
the fixed rate payments. Without the floating rate term, a floating-tofixed interest rate swap would not be enforceable or make any
183
sense.
Moreover, in light of the flexible interpretation apparently intended by Congress, a court might go out of its way—for policy reasons—to find that an interest rate represents a yield, value, or volatility of an interest in a group of securities as the SEC seems to suggest.
Consider an issuer that issues bonds that bear interest at (i) LIBOR
plus one percent when the issuer’s debt-to-equity ratio is less than or
equal to two-to-one and (ii) LIBOR plus three percent when the ratio
is greater than two-to-one. Several years after the bond issuance, the
issuer becomes uncomfortable with the interest rate risk associated
with its variable rate bonds and enters into a “cost-of-funds” interest
184
rate swap under which the counterparty agrees to pay a floating rate
equal to the actual interest rate on the bonds and the issuer pays a
fixed rate equal to eight percent. The counterparty settled on the
fixed rate because the issuer’s debt-to-equity ratio had been no more
than one-to-one since the bonds were issued and because the issuer’s
projections showed ratios of no more than one-to-one during the
term of the swap. It turns out, however, that the issuer’s projections

181
See About SIFMA, supra note 141 (“[F]or an issue to qualify for inclusion in the
[SIFMA Index], it must . . . be a weekly reset . . . .”).
182
See THE HANDBOOK OF MUNICIPAL BONDS, supra note 90, at 297 (“[F]or traditional [VRDOs], the rate . . . is set by the remarketing agent at a level that allows the
bond[s] to be remarketed at a price of par.”).
183
See supra Part II.B.2 (citing Rorech’s conclusion as to what constitutes a material
term and discussing the material terms of a floating-to-fixed interest rate swap).
184
A cost-of-funds swap is one in which the floating rate paid by the counterparty
equals the actual interest rate on particular debt. See HANDBOOK OF MUNICIPAL
BONDS, supra note 90, at 306 (describing a cost-of-funds swap as one in which “floating leg receipts . . . match the interest payments due on the hedged bonds exactly”).
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are fraudulent and the actual ratios exceed three-to-one six months
into the swap. As a result, the interest rate on the bonds increases to
LIBOR plus three percent, and the floating rate likewise increases to
the detriment of the counterparty. If the cost-of-funds swap is not a
security-based swap agreement, the counterparty would have no recourse against the issuer under Exchange Act section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 with respect to the fraudulent projections on which the coun185
terparty based the fixed rate. From a policy perspective, one would
expect that such a cost-of-funds swap—one in which the floating rate
is so intimately linked to a security—would be a security-based swap
agreement subject to section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 because it presents securities-like fraud risk. For that reason, even if a conclusion
that such an interest rate swap is a security-based swap agreement
would require a tortured interpretation of the meaning of price,
186
yield, value, or volatility, a court might be willing to entertain it.
Although, based on the statutory text, a reasonable argument
can be made that a SIFMA Index swap is a security-based swap
agreement, such a result makes little sense from a policy perspec187
tive. Unlike the cost-of-funds swap described above, a SIFMA Index
swap poses virtually no risk of nefarious activities related to the underlying securities. Because only MMD knows the identity of the
component securities, such a large number of securities are involved,
and the component securities change from week to week, it is hard to
think of a situation in which a SIFMA Index swap would pose the
fraud risks normally associated with securities. In a cost-of-funds
swap, a party’s knowledge of information with respect to the issuer of
the applicable debt security can raise the possibility of securities-like
fraud. In contrast, a party to a SIFMA Index swap will have no information about the identity of the VRDOs that are used to determine
the interest rate. Even if a party did have such information, because
185
Because the issuer decided to enter into the swap several years after the bonds
were issued, the counterparty could not argue that the fraud was in connection with
the sale of the bonds and for that reason subject to section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. See
SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 820, 822 (2002) (concluding that a fraud that coincides with securities transaction is subject to section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5).
186
Of course, SIFMA and the defendants in Langford and LeCroy could counter
that, if such a tortured interpretation is necessary for such a cost of-funds swap to be
included in the definition of “security-based swap agreement,” Congress clearly could
not have intended to include a SIFMA Index swap within the definition.
187
See ADAM W. GLASS, “SCARY”: SEC GETS IT WRONG IN MUNI SWAP COMPLAINT
(2008), available at http://www.linklaters.com/pdfs/US/ScarySECgetsitwrong.pdf
(indicating that the Jefferson County SIFMA Index swaps are “within the literal terms
of the statute,” but that treating them as security-based swap agreements does not
make sense from a policy perspective).
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such a large number of obligations are involved, the component ob188
ligations change, and SIFMA makes adjustments for outliers, there
is virtually no chance of profiting by misleading the other party to the
swap regarding the underlying securities or their issuers.
Furthermore, as SIFMA and the defendants in Langford and
LeCroy have pointed out, it seems inappropriate that a SIFMA Index
swap would be a security-based swap agreement when its most common alternative—a LIBOR swap—is not. Like LIBOR, the SIFMA
Index merely serves as a benchmark interest rate. Parties do not enter into SIFMA Index swaps as a substitute for investing in the over
189
600 VRDOs from which the index is determined.
IV. DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION
ACT OF 2010
Dodd-Frank introduced to the world of over-the-counter derivatives a new and extensive regulatory scheme that includes, among
other things, information reporting, clearing, and exchange-trading
190
requirements.
The reform law divides that world into two hemispheres—“swaps” and “security-based swaps.” In general, swaps are
subject to the jurisdiction of the CFTC and security-based swaps are
191
subject to the jurisdiction of the SEC. Dodd-Frank included “security-based swaps” in the definition of “security” under both the Securities Act and the Exchange Act, thereby making them subject to the

188
See SIFMA Brief, supra note 149, at 9–10 (“[I]n calculating the SIFMA . . . Index, MMD (a) eliminates variable rate demand [obligations] whose interest rates fall
outside of +/-1.0 standard deviations and (b) limits notes handled by a single remarketing agent to no more than 15% of the SIFMA . . . Index.”).
189
See GLASS, supra note 187, at 2 (“In a municipal bond fixed-to-floating interest
rate swap, . . . the [SIFMA] Index is supposed to be a proxy for current tax-exempt
market rates, not an investment medium . . . .”).
190
See Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 723, 124 Stat. 1376, 1675–82 (2010)
(to be codified in 7 U.S.C. § 2) (clearing of swaps); id. § 727 124 Stat. at 1696–97 (to
be codified at 7 U.S.C. §2(a)) (public reporting of swaps); id. § 733 124 Stat. at 1712–
17 (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. 7b-2) (swap execution facilities); id. § 763, 124 Stat. at
1762–84 (to be codified in subsections of 15 U.S.C. § 78) (clearing of security-based
swaps); § 766, 124 Stat. at 1797–99 (to be codified in subsections of 15 U.S.C. § 78)
(public reporting for security-based swaps and security-based swap execution facilities); see also Ryan J. Maierson, Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act: The General Counsel’s Quick Reference Guide, in 2010 HOW TO PREPARE FOR THE
UPCOMING PROXY SEASON at 371, 391–400 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice, Course Handbook Series No. B-1185, 2010) (describing the effect of Dodd-Frank on the over-thecounter derivatives market that previously was largely unregulated).
191
Dodd-Frank Act § 712(b), 124 Stat. at 1642–43 (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. §
2(a)(1)); id. § 722(a), 124 Stat. at 1642–43 (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1)).

MOLONY_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

6/24/2012 12:32 PM

STILL FLOATING

989

registration, information-reporting, and antifraud provisions of those
192
laws.
The term “swap,” which Dodd-Frank added to Commodity Ex193
change Act (CEA) section 1a , is broadly defined and overlaps in
most respects with the term “swap agreement” in GLBA section 206A,
194
It excludes, however, most “securityas amended by Dodd-Frank.
195
based swaps.”
Dodd-Frank added the term “security-based swap” to Exchange
Act section 3(a) and defined it as an agreement, contract, or transaction that would be a swap (as defined in the CEA), but for the fact
that it is based on
(I)an index that is a narrow-based security index, including any
interest therein or on the value thereof;
(II)a single security or loan, including any interest therein or on
the value thereof; or
(III)the occurrence, nonoccurrence, or extent of the occurrence
of an event relating to a single issuer of a security or the issuers of
securities in a narrow-based security index, provided that such
event directly affects the financial statements, financial condition,
196
or financial obligations of the issuer.

The term “narrow-based security index” is not new; the CFMA in 2000
197
added it to both the CEA and the Exchange Act. Put simply, a narrow-based security index is an index with nine or fewer component
securities, an index in which one security is weighted more than thirty percent, an index in which the five most highly weighted securities
are weighted more than sixty percent, or an index in which the securities in the bottom twenty five percent of the index’s total weight
198
have low average daily trading volumes.
192

15 U.S.C.A. § 77b(a)(1) (West 2011); id. § 78c(a)(10).
Pub. L. No. 74-675, 49 Stat. 1491 (1936) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§1–
25 (2006)).
194
Compare Dodd-Frank Act § 721(a)(21), 124 Stat. at 1666–69 (to be codified at 7
U.S.C § 1a(47)), with Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 206A, 15 U.S.C. § 78c note, amended
by Dodd-Frank Act § 762(b), 124 Stat. at 1759 (to be codified as note to 15 U.S.C.
§78c).
195
Dodd-Frank Act § 721(a)(21), 124 Stat. at 1668 (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. §
1a(47)(B)(x)).
196
Id. § 761(a)(6), 124 Stat. at 1756–57 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. §
78(c)(a)(68)).
197
7 U.S.C. § 1a(25) (2006); 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(55)(B) (2006).
198
15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(55)(B) (2006). A narrow based security index includes one
“(iv) in which the lowest weighted component securities, comprising, in the aggregate, 25 percent of the index’s weighting have an aggregate dollar value of average
daily trading volume of less than $50,000,000 (or in the case of an index with 15 or
more component securities, $30,000,000).” Id.
193
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Dodd-Frank appropriately recognized that a single agreement,
contract, or transaction could have attributes of both a security-based
swap (e.g., be based on a single stock) and a swap (e.g., be based on
an interest rate, currency, or commodity) and provided that such an
agreement, contract, or transaction—what Dodd-Frank refers to as a
199
“mixed swap”—is both a swap and a security-based swap.
Mixed
swaps are subject to the broad jurisdiction of both the CFTC and the
SEC.
Notwithstanding the sweeping reform and the new jurisdictional
division, Dodd-Frank retained the term “security-based swap agreement” and most of the provisions of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act that apply to security-based swap agreements. The reform, however, did make some adjustments. First, it moved the
definition of “security-based swap agreement” from GLBA section
200
206B to Exchange Act section 3(a)(78). Second, although the text
of the new Exchange Act definition is substantially the same as the
one under GLBA, its scope was curtailed because Exchange Act §
3(a)(78) provides that “[t]he term ‘security-based swap agreement’
201
does not include any security-based swap.”
Finally, Dodd-Frank
modified the meaning of “security-based swap agreement” by amending the definition of the term “swap agreement” in GLBA section
206A to include agreements, contracts, and transactions that are not
entered into by eligible contract participants and those whose mate202
rial terms are not subject to individual negotiation.
Under Dodd-Frank, a security-based swap agreement is a “swap,”
203
not a “security-based swap.”
As “swaps,” security-based swap agree199
See Dodd-Frank Act § 721(a)(21), 124 Stat. at 1668 (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. §
1a(47)(B)(x), (D)) (including a mixed swap in the definitions of the term “swap”);
id. § 761(a)(6), 124 Stat. at 1757 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(68)(D)) (including a mixed swap in the definitions of the term “security-based swap”).
200
See Dodd-Frank Act § 762(a), 124 Stat. at 1759 (repealing Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act § 206B, 15 U.S.C. § 78c note (2006)); id. § 761(a)(6), 124 Stat. at 1759 (to be
codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(78)) (amending Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §
3(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (2006), to add the definition of “security-based swap agreement”).
201
15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78c(a), (78)(B) (West 2011).
202
Dodd-Frank Act § 762(b), 124 Stat. at 1759 (amending Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act § 206A, 15 U.S.C. § 78c note); see supra note 31 and accompanying text (quoting
a portion of GLBA section 206A definition of “swap agreement” before it was
amended by Dodd-Frank). Notwithstanding the fact that Dodd-Frank moved the definition of “security-based swap agreement” from the GLBA to the Exchange Act, the
definition in the Exchange Act still incorporates the definition of “swap agreement”
in GLBA section 206A. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78c(a)(78) (West 2011).
203
7 U.S.C.A. § 1a(47)(A)(5) (West 2011); 15 U.S.C.A § 78c(a)(78)(B) (West
2011).

MOLONY_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

6/24/2012 12:32 PM

STILL FLOATING

991

ments generally are subject to CFTC jurisdiction, but through the
continuing effectiveness of CFMA amendments, the SEC shares antifraud jurisdiction over them with the CFTC. The nomenclature used
by Congress is a recipe for confusion, and Dodd-Frank’s legislative
history is not very helpful in interpreting any of the three terms. The
legislative history includes little more than conclusory statements
about the jurisdictional division between the SEC and the CFTC with
204
respect to over-the-counter derivatives.
Unfortunately, SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro’s 2009 testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Securities, Insurance, and Investment does little to help because it describes a jurisdictional scheme different from what
Congress finally settled on in Dodd-Frank. In her testimony, Chairman Schapiro distinguished between “securities-related” derivatives
and “non-securities-related derivatives”:
An [over-the-counter] derivative is “securities-related” when the
reference is to an entity that is an issuer of securities (such as a
public company), to a security itself (or a related event such as a
dividend payment), to a group or index of securities or issuers, or
based on related aspects of a security or group or index of securities or issuers, such as price, yield, volatility, dividend payments,
or value. . . .
....
. . . Securities-related [over-the-counter] derivatives would include
equity derivatives and credit and other fixed income derivatives.
Non-securities-related derivatives would include interest rate derivatives, foreign currency derivatives, and all non-financial deriva205
tives.

Chairman Schapiro appears to have been recommending that the
scope of the term “security-based swap agreement” be expanded and
that the SEC’s authority with respect to security-based swap agree-

204

Congressman Peterson described the jurisdictional landscape as follows:
Title VII [of the bill] allocates authority over swaps and security-based swaps as follows. First, the CFTC has exclusive jurisdiction over swaps, including swaps on broadbased security indexes. Within the swap definition is a category of swaps called security-based swap agreements. For this specific category of swaps, the CFTC will continue to exercise its full jurisdictional authority, while the SEC may exercise certain
specific authorities over these products, as outlined in Title VII. Title VII also clarifies that the SEC has jurisdiction over security-based swaps, which are swaps on narrow-based security indexes and single securities, and that the two agencies share authority over mixed swaps.
See 156 CONG. REC. H5,256 (daily ed. June 30, 2010) (statement of Rep. Peterson).
205
Schapiro Testimony, supra note 14, at 45, 49.
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206

ments be extended beyond antifraud.
Indeed, she suggested that
“primary responsibility for ‘securities-related’ [over-the-counter] de207
rivatives . . . be retained by the SEC.” She did not describe a scheme
such as the one in Dodd-Frank under which the SEC has comprehensive jurisdiction over derivatives very closely tied to securities and
merely antifraud jurisdiction over derivatives more loosely related to
securities.
Although Dodd-Frank’s legislative history is not very helpful, the
reform law provided an opportunity for clarity by directing the CFTC
and the SEC jointly to further define the terms “swap,” “security208
based swap,” and “security-based swap agreement.”
In May 2011,
the CFTC and the SEC accordingly proposed interpretive guidance
209
and, in limited cases, proposed rules with respect to the terms.
The two commissions provided extensive guidance with respect to the
terms “swap” and “security-based swap,” but stated that they did not
believe it “possible to provide a bright line test to define” a securitybased swap agreement and offered only three examples of types of
210
swaps that “clearly fall within the definition.”
One of the examples—“a swap on an index of securities that is not a narrow-based se211
curity index” —is hardly an example at all; it merely states what is
obvious from reading the statutory definitions of “security-based swap
agreement” and “security-based swap” together. As to “security-based
swap agreements,” then, the likelihood of achieving clarity appears
bleak.

206

See id. at 49 (urging Congress to include “securities-related [over-the-counter]
derivatives” in the definition of security and thereby subject those derivatives to
broad regulation under the federal securities laws).
207
Id. at 104 (emphasis added).
208
Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 712(d)(1), 124 Stat. 1376, 1644 (2010)
(to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 8302).
209
See generally Further Definition of “Swap,” “Security-Based Swap,” and “SecurityBased Swap Agreement”; Mixed Swaps; Security-Based Swap Agreement Recordkeeping, 76 Fed. Reg. 29818 (proposed May 23, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 1,
240) (proposing interpretive guidance and rules regarding the terms “swap,” “security-based swap,” and “security-based swap agreement”).
210
Id. at 29863.
211
Id.
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V. THE FUTURE OF THE SECURITY-BASED SWAP AGREEMENT:
A CONCEPT WHOSE TIME HAS PASSED OR A BENEFICIAL REMNANT OF A
BYGONE ERA?
A. A Concept Whose Time Has Passed
The spotty—and sparse—history of the term “security-based
swap agreement” raises the question of whether the concept is needed or beneficial in Dodd-Frank’s new, comprehensive regulatory
scheme for over-the-counter derivatives. The provisions in the Securities Act and the Exchange Act with respect to security-based swap
agreements no doubt offer some benefits in SEC antifraud enforcement. In light of Dodd-Frank, however, the benefits are limited at
best and are outweighed by the difficulties the concept presents.
Therefore, for a number of reasons, Congress should eliminate the
“security-based swap agreement” concept from the federal securities
laws.
1.

The Concept Was Used Sparingly Prior to Dodd-Frank
and Dodd-Frank Makes the Concept More
Inconsequential

Since Congress enacted the CFMA in 2000, cases involving alleged fraud related to security-based swap agreements have been few.
The scope of the term was not considered by a court in a substantive
way until 2005, when the United States District Court for the District
212
of New Jersey decided St. Matthew’s.
It was not until 2008—more
than seven years after the CFMA was enacted—that the SEC brought
its first enforcement action with respect to an alleged security-based
213
swap agreement in Langford. It was not until 2010, in Rorech, that a
court issued a substantive opinion regarding an SEC enforcement ac214
tion with respect to a security-based swap agreement.
During its
over-ten-year history, therefore, the provisions employing the term
have been relatively inconsequential. With the adoption of DoddFrank, they are even more so.
By excluding security-based swaps from the definition, DoddFrank curtailed the scope of the term “security-based swap agreement.” As discussed above, other than the exclusion of security-based
swaps, the definition is the same as it was prior to the reform act.
Consequently, over-the-counter derivatives, such as the swap in St.

212
213
214

See supra notes 78–85 and accompanying text (discussing St. Matthew’s).
See supra Part III (discussing Langford).
See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing Rorech).
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Matthew’s, which did not satisfy the pre-Dodd-Frank definition, also
215
do not satisfy the post-Dodd-Frank definition.
Some over-thecounter derivatives that previously satisfied the definition of “securitybased swap agreement,” however, no longer do so because they fit the
definition of “security-based swap.” For example, the swaps at issue in
Caiola and Rorech satisfied the pre-Dodd-Frank definition, but those
same swaps would not satisfy the post-Dodd-Frank definition because
216
they would be considered security-based swaps.
For an agreement, contract or transaction to be a security-based
swap:
• the agreement, contract or transaction must be a swap
(without taking into account the exclusion of securitybased swaps from the definition of “swap” in CEA section 1a(47)); and
• the swap must be based on any one of the following:
o a narrow-based security index or an interest in or the
value of a narrow-based security index;
o a single security or an interest in or the value of a
single security;
o a single loan or an interest in or the value of a single loan; or
o a financial event directly affecting a single issuer of a
security or the issuers of securities in a narrow217
based security index.
215

See supra notes 84–89 and accompanying text (discussing the swap at issue in St.
Matthew’s).
216
The interpretive guidance proposed by the CFTC and the SEC confirms that
the Ciaola and Rorech swaps would have been security-based swaps. The equity swaps
in Ciaola were total return swaps. See Further Definition of “Swap,” “Security-Based
Swap,” and “Security-Based Swap Agreement”; Mixed Swaps; Security-Based Swap
Agreement Recordkeeping, 76 Fed. Reg. 29818, 29842 (proposed May 23, 2011) (to
be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 1, 240) (defining a total return swap as one “in which
one counterparty . . . makes a payment that is based on the price appreciation and
income from an underlying security . . . [and t]he other counterparty . . . makes a
financing payment . . ., as well as a payment based on the price depreciation of the
[security]”); Alex Raskolnikov, The Cost of Norms: Tax Effects of Tacit Understandings, 74
U. CHI. L. REV. 601, 618 n.88 (“An equity swap is a total return swap referencing an
equity security or a basket of securities.”). According to the CFTC and the SEC,
“where a [total return swap] is based on a single security . . . , the [total return swap]
is a security-based swap.” Further Definition of “Swap,” “Security-Based Swap,” and
“Security-Based Swap Agreement”; Mixed Swaps; Security-Based Swap Agreement
Recordkeeping, 76 Fed. Reg. at 29842. The guidance similarly provides that a credit
default swap, like the one in Rorech, that is “triggered by a [financial] event relating
to the issuer . . . [is] a security-based swap.” Id. at 29843.
217
See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78c(a)(68) (West 2011).
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The meaning of “based on” is an open question under DoddFrank, but the reform Act’s amendments to CEA section 4a(a) under
218
section 737, its treatment of so-called “mixed swaps,” and the interpretive guidance proposed by the CFTC and the SEC provide some
219
insight as to the term. The use of the phrase “directly based on” in
amended CEA section 4a(a)(4)(B) and the absence of the word “directly” from the definition of “security-based swap” suggest a somewhat flexible interpretation of the term “based on” in the definition
of “security-based swap.” Moreover, the inclusion of mixed swaps in
the definition indicates that “based on” does not require an exclusive
relationship. On the other hand, the proposed interpretative guidance indicates that not just any relationship will suffice. The mere
fact that a term of an instrument is “informed by [a] value or level of
a security, rate, or other commodity at the time of the execution”
220
does not mean that the instrument is a security-based swap.
Considering these points, perhaps Rorech’s interpretation of “based on”—
as requiring a relationship between two items in which one is a “fundamental part or ingredient of, or principal component of” the oth221
er—may apply equally to the definition of “security-based swap.”
The equity swaps in Caiola easily satisfy the definition of securitybased swap. They related to a single security—Philip Morris stock—
and were the functional equivalent of trading in the security. With
equity swaps specifically listed in the definition of “swap” under CEA
section 1a(47), the Caiola equity swaps would have been swaps. In
addition, because the Caiola equity swaps were related exclusively to
Philip Morris stock, they would be considered “based on” a single security under any interpretation of the phrase.
The CDSs at issue in Rorech also satisfy the definition of securitybased swap. Like equity swaps, CDSs specifically are listed in the CEA
“swap” definition. Therefore, the Rorech CDSs would have been
swaps. Moreover, payments under the Rorech swaps were triggered on
the occurrence of a credit event (which certainly would have been a
financial event under the definition of “security-based swap”) relating
to VNU, a single issuer of bonds, which are securities.

218

See supra note 199 and accompanying text (indicating that instruments that
have attributes of both a swap and a security-based swap are treated as both).
219
Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 737(a)(4), 124 Stat. at 1724 (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. § 6a(a)(4)(B)) (emphasis added).
220
Further Definition of “Swap,” “Security-Based Swap,” and “Security-Based Swap
Agreement”; Mixed Swaps; Security-Based Swap Agreement Recordkeeping, 76 Fed.
Reg. at 29845.
221
SEC v. Rorech, 720 F. Supp. 2d 367, 405 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
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As discussed in Part II.B.3, the swaps at issue in Elliott, Wyly, and
Goldman Sachs likely satisfied the pre-Dodd-Frank definition of “security-based swap agreement” for the same reasons that the swaps in
222
Because those cases are short on details reCaiola and Rorech did.
garding the mechanics of the swaps at issue, it is difficult to analyze
with specificity whether those swaps would meet the definition of “security-based swap” and therefore be excluded from the definition of
“security-based swap agreement” post-Dodd-Frank. Nevertheless, given the apparent similarity of the swaps in Elliott and Wyly to those in
Caiola and the apparent similarity of the CDSs in Goldman Sachs to the
CDSs in Rorech, it seems likely that the swaps in Elliott, Wyly, and Goldman Sachs similarly would be security-based swaps and thus not security-based swap agreements post-Dodd-Frank.
The only other cases dealing with over-the-counter derivatives
that met or were alleged to have met the pre-Dodd-Frank definition
of “security-based swap agreement” were those in School District of Erie,
Langford, and LeCroy, and it is uncertain whether the swaps at issue in
those cases would meet the post-Dodd-Frank definition. What is certain is that the School District of Erie swaption would not be a securitybased swap; therefore, it would not be excluded from the post-DoddFrank definition of “security-based swap agreement” for that reason.
Although the School District of Erie swaption is not clearly outside the
statutory definition of “security-based swap,” the interpretive guidance proposed by the CFTC and the SEC confirms that it is in fact
excluded. The guidance states that interest rate swaps based solely
223
on LIBOR are not security-based swaps.
Moreover, the guidance
makes clear that the mere fact that the fixed rate in the School District
of Erie swaption was determined in reference to the related bonds
224
would not be sufficient to make the swaption a security-based swap.
Whether the SIFMA Index swaps in Langford and LeCroy would
be security-based swaps, and therefore excluded from the post-DoddFrank definition of “security-based swap agreement,” is less clear.
The definition of “security-based swap” in Exchange Act section
3(a)(68) provides that the term “index” means “an index or group of
222

See supra Part II.B.3 (discussing Elliott, Wyly, and Goldman Sachs).
Further Definition of “Swap,” “Security-Based Swap,” and “Security-Based Swap
Agreement”; Mixed Swaps; Security-Based Swap Agreement Recordkeeping, 76 Fed.
Reg. at 29840.
224
See id. at 29845 (stating that the fact that a term of a swap is “informed by the
value or level of a security, rate, or other commodity at the time of execution” does
not itself determine whether the instrument is a swap or security-based swap, “provided that the . . . term . . . is set at the time of execution . . . and the value or level of
that fixed term or condition may not vary over the life of the [instrument.]”).
223
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225

securities.”
Thus, if the group of VRDOs used to calculate the
SIFMA Index is a narrow-based security index and if the SIFMA Index
represents an interest in that group or the value of that group for purposes of the definition of “security-based swap,” a SIFMA Index swap
226
might be included.
The term “narrow-based security index” was defined by the
CFMA in connection with permitting the trading of securities futures
227
in the United States. Several years after the CFMA was enacted, the
SEC and the CFTC noted that “most indexes composed of debt secu228
rities . . . would fall within the statutory definition.”
Considering
this generally inappropriate, the SEC and CFTC adopted Rule 3a55-2
under the Exchange Act to exclude certain debt indexes from the
229
definition.
Under the proposed rules issued by the SEC and the
CFTC pursuant to Dodd-Frank, Rule 3a55-2 would apply to the definition of “security-based swap” to the same extent as it applies to the
230
definition of “security future.”
Without knowing the make-up of
the group of over 600 securities used to calculate the SIFMA Index
and because the group changes from week to week, it is hard even to
speculate whether a particular group would fit within the statutory
definition of “narrow-based security index” or qualify for the exclusion under Rule 3a55-2.
225

15 U.S.C.A. § 78c(a)(68)(E) (West 2011) (emphasis added). The term generally excludes a swap that would be a security-based swap by virtue of being based on
an exempted security, but it includes one that is based on a municipal security. Id. §
78c(a)(68)(C). The exclusion uses the definitions of “exempted security” and “municipal security” that were in effect when the Futures Trading Act of 1982 was enacted. Id.
226
In light of the fact that the SIFMA Index is calculated based on a single attribute of the underlying group of securities, an argument that a SIFMA Index swap is
based on the underlying group of securities (rather than an interest in or the value
of the group) is not viable.
227
See Edward J. Rosen & Geoffrey B. Goldman, The Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, in SWAPS & OTHER DERIVATIVES IN 2001, at 573, 579 (PLI Corp. &
Practice Course, Handbook Series No. B-1280 2001) (noting that the CFMA permitted trading in futures on narrow-based securities indexes).
228
Joint Final Rules: Application of Narrow-Based Security Index to Debt Security
Indexes and Security Futures on Debt Securities, 71 Fed. Reg. 39534, 39534 (July 13,
2006) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240).
229
17 C.F.R. 240.3a55-2 (2011).
230
See Further Definition of “Swap,” “Security-Based Swap,” and “Security-Based
Swap Agreement”; Mixed Swaps; Security-Based Swap Agreement Recordkeeping, 76
Fed. Reg. 29818, 29896 (proposed May 23, 2011) (to be codified at 17 CFR pts. 1,
240) (providing that, under Proposed Rule 240.3a68-3(a), the rules and regulations
interpreting the term “narrow-based security index” generally apply to the definition
of “security-based swap” to the same extent as they apply to the definition of “security
future”).
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Whether a SIFMA Index swap would be considered based on an
interest in the underlying group or the value of the underlying group
is a difficult question. Unlike the definition of “security-based swap
agreement,” the term “value” in the definition of “security-based
swap” refers only to a security or group of securities as a whole, rather
than to an interest in a security or group of securities. An interest rate
clearly does not represent the value of all of the interests in a security
or group of securities, so a SIFMA Index swap should not be a security-based swap for that reason. Whether a SIFMA Index swap might be
considered based on an interest in the underlying group of securities
is anyone’s guess.
Mention of the SIFMA Index is notably absent from the interpretive guidance and rules proposed by the CFTC and the SEC. The
guidance states that when an instrument is “based solely on levels of
interest rates or other monetary rates that are not themselves based
on one or more securities, the instrument would be a swap and not a
231
security-based swap.”
It states elsewhere that “if [an] interest rate
swap contain[s] additional terms that [are] in fact contingent on a
characteristic of [a] debt security, such as an adjustment to future interest rate swap payments based on the future price or yield of the
232
debt security, [the instrument] would be a security-based swap.”
Unfortunately, the “guidance” leaves open questions as to whether
the group of securities used to calculate the SIFMA Index constitutes
a narrow-based security index and, if it does, whether a SIFMA Index
swap is based on that group or an interest in that group.
2.

The Security-Based Swap Definition Allows Appropriate
Allocation of Jurisdiction

The cases involving alleged security-based swap agreements have
been at two extremes—those in which SEC jurisdiction is clearly appropriate and those in which SEC jurisdiction is clearly unnecessary.
The definition of “security-based swap agreement” at worst results in,
and at best leaves uncertain the question of, SEC jurisdiction in cases
where such jurisdiction is clearly unnecessary. The definition of “security-based swap,” when coupled with the interpretive guidance proposed by the CFTC and the SEC, appears to strike a better balance.
As discussed above, if Dodd-Frank had been in effect when the
swaps at issue in Caiola, Rorech, Elliott, Wyly, and Goldman Sachs were
entered into, the swaps in Caiola and Rorech would have been, and the

231
232

Id. at 29840.
Id. at 29845.
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ones in Elliott, Wyly, and Goldman Sachs likely would have been, security-based swaps and therefore subject to SEC jurisdiction. Such a result is appropriate because the types of swaps at issue in those cases
present securities-like fraud risks. This is particularly true as to the
type of swaps at issue in Caiola, Elliott, and Wyly, which can serve as
233
substitutes for trading in securities.
234
Similarly, the cost-of-funds swap described in Part III.C, which
also presents securities-like fraud risks, would be a security-based swap
and subject to SEC antifraud jurisdiction. Interest rate swaps are specifically listed in the definition of “swap” under CEA section 1a(47),
the swap clearly is connected to a single security—the related bonds—
and although the meaning of “based on” is not entirely clear, the interpretive guidance specifically states that “if [an] interest rate swap
contain[s] . . . terms that are . . . contingent on a characteristic of
debt security that may change in the future, . . . then [the instru235
ment] would be a security-based swap.”
Unlike the swaps at issue in Caiola, Rorech, Elliott, Wyly, and Goldman Sachs and the cost-of-funds swap described in Part III.C, the
swaps at issue in St. Matthew’s, School District of Erie, Langford, and
LeCroy should not be subject to SEC antifraud jurisdiction because
they do not represent securities-like fraud risks. As discussed earlier,
it is clear that the School District of Erie swaption would escape the definition of “security-based swap.” For the same reasons, the St. Matthew’s swap would as well. Unfortunately, that result is not certain
with respect to the SIFMA Index swaps at issue in Langford and LeCroy.
Nevertheless, it seems more difficult to argue that those swaps satisfy
the definition of security-based swap than it is to argue that they are
security-based swap agreements. As discussed in Part III.C, one can
make a reasonable argument that the SIFMA Index swaps were security-based swap agreements because the SIFMA Index is determined
from interest rates that are set based on the prices of the underlying
securities (i.e., the VRDOs). In contrast, even assuming that the

233

See SEC v. Rorech, 720 F. Supp. 2d 367, 400 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“CDSs that reference single corporate entities are viewed by market participants as synthetic bond
positions in those entities, with the purchase of CDS protection being the equivalent
of shorting a corporate bond, and the selling of protection being the equivalent of
buying a bond.”); Caiola v. Citibank, N.A., 137 F. Supp. 2d 362, 365 n.1 (S.D.N.Y.
2001) (describing how an equity swap replicates the economics of purchasing a security).
234
See supra Part III.C (describing an example of a “cost-of-funds” swap).
235
Further Definition of “Swap,” “Security-Based Swap,” and “Security-Based Swap
Agreement”; Mixed Swaps; Security-Based Swap Agreement Recordkeeping, 76 Fed.
Reg. at 29840.
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group of securities used to calculate the SIFMA Index constitutes a
narrow-based security index, it would take some mental gymnastics to
conclude that the SIFMA Index’s composite interest rate represents
an interest in that group of underlying securities.
Based on the pre-Dodd-Frank cases that involved alleged security-based swap agreements, allocating antifraud jurisdiction to the SEC
using the term “security-based swap” appears to strike a better (or at
least a marginally clearer) balance than the term “security-based swap
agreement” achieved before the reform act. The swaps at issue in
those pre-Dodd-Frank cases that raised securities-like fraud concerns
would be security-based swaps subject to broad SEC jurisdiction postDodd-Frank, and the swaps that did not raise those concerns likely
would be swaps subject to broad CFTC jurisdiction.
3.

The Term Has Been Poorly Interpreted

As discussed in Part II.C of this Article, the term “security-based
swap agreement” has been poorly interpreted. The St. Matthew’s
court reached a sweeping conclusion that LIBOR swaps cannot be
“security-based swap agreements” and failed to give appropriate attention to the connection between the swap at issue in the case and
the related loan agreement. School District of Erie followed suit and virtually ignored the fact that the LIBOR-based swaption at issue in that
case had a fixed rate that very likely was determined using the interest
rates for related bonds. As a result, School District of Erie never addressed the consequence of having a swap rate equal to an interest
rate of a debt security. Because the connection between the swaps
and the related loan and bonds in St. Matthew’s and School District of
Erie did not present securities-type fraud risks with respect to the
swaps, the courts in those cases reached appropriate conclusions
from a policy perspective. Their cursory analyses, however, bode ill
for the future. After St. Matthew’s was decided, the courts in School
District of Erie and Rorech mindlessly repeated the conclusion that
LIBOR-based swaps cannot be security-based swap agreements. If the
court in St. Matthew’s appropriately had based its holding on the fact
that the loan agreement related to the swap was not a security, the
court in School District of Erie might have given more studied attention
to the fact that the School District of Erie swaption indeed had a connection to a security.
In their recent proposed interpretive guidance, the CFTC and
the SEC made clear that the fact that a “fixed term[] or condition[]
of [an instrument has been] informed by the value or level of a security, rate, or other commodity at the time of execution of the instru-
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ment” should not have an impact on whether an instrument is a swap
or a security-based swap as long as “the fixed term or condition is set at
the time of execution . . . and the value or level of that fixed term
236
Consequently, as
may not vary over the life of the [instrument].”
indicated above, the swaption in School District of Erie would not be a
security-based swap even though the fixed rate in the swaption likely
237
was determined by reference to interest rates for the related bonds.
Unfortunately, the commissions provided no similar guidance with
respect to security-based swap agreements, leaving the School District of Erie
conclusion that the swaption was not a security-based swap agreement
open to dispute.
4.

The Term Is Overly Broad

The fact that one reasonably could conclude that the plain
meaning of the term “security-based swap agreement” includes a
238
SIFMA Index swap suggests that the term is overly broad.
As discussed earlier, a SIFMA Index swap does not pose the risks normally
associated with securities and therefore does not warrant coverage
239
under the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws.
Sadly, it appears that the SEC and the CFTC have not corrected
the overreaching application of the term “security-based swap agreement” to SIFMA Index swaps in their proposed rulemaking. In their
proposed interpretative guidance, the commissions stated that “a
swap based on certain . . . exempted securities other than municipal
240
securities” clearly is a security-based swap agreement. Although this
might be read to imply that a swap based on a municipal security
241
(which would include the VRDOs used for the SIFMA Index) is not
a security-based swap agreement, the fact that a swap based on ex236
See id. at 29818 (proposing interpretive guidance and rules regarding the terms
“swap,” “security-based swap,” and “security-based swap agreement”).
237
See id. at 29840 (providing that swaps based solely on LIBOR are not securitybased swaps).
238
See supra Part III.C (discussing arguments that a SIFMA Index swap is a security-based swap agreement).
239
See supra Part III.C (indicating that SIFMA Index swaps ought not be subject to
the provisions of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act with respect to securitybased swap agreements).
240
Further Definition of “Swap,” “Security-Based Swap,” and “Security-Based Swap
Agreement”; Mixed Swaps; Security-Based Swap Agreement Recordkeeping, 76 Fed.
Reg. at 29863.
241
See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(29) (2006) (defining the term “municipal securities”);
supra note 158 and accompanying text (noting SIFMA’s assertion that municipal
bonds are used for the SIFMA Index because they are the only instruments with taxexempt rates).
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empted securities other than municipal securities definitively is a security-based swap agreement does not necessarily mean that one based
on municipal securities is not. The fact that the commissions left this
question open is not surprising. Both Langford and LeCroy were still
pending when the proposed guidance and rules were published, and
it is extremely unlikely that the SEC would propose or adopt a rule
that might compromise its litigation position. Langford has already
been decided, but even if the litigation in LeCroy concludes by the
time the final rules are adopted, it seems doubtful that the SEC will
adopt a rule contrary to its position in those cases.
Fortunately, Dodd-Frank may have given a measure of relief
from rigid interpretations of the term “security-based swap agreement.” Although seemingly insignificant, Dodd-Frank’s movement of
the definition from GLBA section 206B to Exchange Act section 3(a)
may allow for a more flexible interpretation of the term. The introductory language preceding all of the definitions under Exchange
242
Act section 3(a) states “unless the context otherwise requires.” No
similar language applies to GLBA section 206B. Arguably, Exchange
Act section 3(a)’s introductory language gives courts room to apply
policy-based reasoning in interpreting Exchange Act definitions. Unlike the court in LeCroy, then, a court considering a SIFMA Index
swap under the post-Dodd Frank definition of “security-based swap
agreement” seems to have the flexibility to determine that, notwithstanding the fact that the swap satisfies a strict interpretation of the
definitional text, the swap in fact does not satisfy the definition because its connection to a security is inconsequential for antifraud
purposes.
5.

The Concept Is Redundant

The CFMA created a federal regulatory void, one in which most
over-the-counter derivatives were not subject to the provisions of ei243
ther the federal securities laws or commodities laws.
In order to

242

§ 78c(a).
See id. § 77b-1(a) (providing that non-security-based swap agreements were not
securities); id. 78c-1(a) (same). The CFMA added two provisions to the CEA that
were intended to—and clearly did—exclude most swaps from the CEA. Section
2(d)(1) of the CEA excluded from most provisions of the Act, any agreement, contract, or transaction in an excluded commodity if the agreement, contract, or transaction is entered into only between persons that are eligible contract participants
and is not executed or traded on a trading facility. 7 U.S.C. § 2(d)(1) (2006). Section 2(g) similarly excluded from most provisions of the CEA any agreement, contract, or transaction in a commodity other than an agricultural commodity if the
agreement is entered into only between persons that are eligible contract partici243
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make sure that appropriate antifraud enforcement would be available
in circumstances related to securities, it made sense for Congress to
cast a wide net with the term “security-based swap agreement” and
capture some transactions that really are not significant to the securities markets. In the context of Dodd-Frank’s sweeping regulation of
the over-the-counter derivatives market, however, such overly broad
SEC antifraud jurisdiction is no longer necessary. After Dodd-Frank,
there is no federal regulatory void. By dividing the world of over-thecounter derivatives into swaps and security-based swaps, Congress
made sure that the CFTC’s jurisdiction picks up where the SEC’s jurisdiction leaves off.
In Dodd-Frank, Congress amended CEA section 6(c) to prohibit,
“in connection with any swap, . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance . . . in contravention of such rules and regulations
244
as the [CFTC] shall promulgate.” Because of the similarity between
the language in CEA section 6(c) and that in Exchange Act section
10(b), the CFTC has adopted a rule “model[ed] . . . on SEC Rule
245
10b-5.” Moreover, Congress’s amendment of CEA section 22(a)(1)
246
grants a private cause of action with respect to swaps. With DoddFrank’s changes to the CEA and the CFTC’s new rule, security-based
swap agreements are subject to the antifraud jurisdiction of two federal agencies and private litigants have very similar recourse under
both the CEA and the Exchange Act. The continuing application of
Exchange Act section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 to security-based swap
agreements, therefore, leaves a redundancy.
The proposed guidance and rules published by the SEC and the
CFTC seem to indicate that even the commissions themselves have
found that the “security-based swap agreement” concept is redundant. The two commissions declined Congress’s invitation to adopt
rules governing books and records for security-based swap agreements and asserted that the CFTC’s rules governing swaps generally
247
are sufficient for security-based swap agreements. Furthermore, out
pants, is subject to individual negotiation and is not executed on a trading facility.
Id. § 2(g).
244
Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 753(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1750 (2010) (to
be codified at 7 U.S.C. § 9(c)(1)).
245
Prohibition on the Employment, or Attempted Employment, of Manipulative
and Deceptive Devices and Prohibition of Price Manipulation, 76 Fed. Reg. 41,398,
41,399 (July 14, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 180).
246
Dodd-Frank Act § 753(c), 124 Stat. at 1754 (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. §
25(a)(1)(D)).
247
Further Definition of “Swap,” “Security-Based Swap,” and “Security-Based Swap
Agreement”; Mixed Swaps; Security-Based Swap Agreement Recordkeeping, 76 Fed.
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of over eighty pages of proposed rules and interpretive guidance, the
commissions devoted only two paragraphs to the definition of the
term “security-based swap agreement,” and they indicated that they
had received no comments with respect to the definition of the term
and had not “been made aware of any significant market confusion
248
over what constitutes a [security-based swap agreement].” The lack
of commentary indicates that market participants do not care. PostDodd-Frank, virtually all over-the-counter derivatives are subject to
broad federal antifraud statutes. It is no longer a question of whether
there is antifraud jurisdiction. It is now a question of who has it.
6.

The Term Creates Confusion

Although it certainly is not the most important reason to eliminate the “security-based swap agreement” concept from the Securities
Act and the Exchange Act, having both “security-based swaps” and
“security-based swap agreements” in the same regulatory regime creates
the potential for confusion. If Congress wanted to retain the term
“security-based swap agreement,” it should have been more creative
in the names it gave in Dodd-Frank to the over-the-counter derivatives subject to broad SEC jurisdiction and those subject to broad
CFTC jurisdiction. A footnote in the District Court’s opinion in Elliott may be a preview of the confusion that could be forthcoming. In
that case, the court suggested that the reform broadened the mean249
ing of “security-based swap.”
Dodd-Frank, of course, did no such
thing. The term “security-based swap” is a new term, and the term
“security-based swap agreement” was narrowed in the reform.
Much needs to be done to understand the scope of the new regulatory scheme. Notwithstanding the fact that the CFTC and the SEC
did not receive comments on the definition of “security-based swap
agreement,” the term has been a source of confusion in the past—as
St. Matthew’s, School District of Erie, Langford, and LeCroy evidence. Its
continuing role alongside a new term with a substantially similar
name only creates the possibility of more confusion.

Reg. 29818, 29863 (proposed May 23, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 1, 240);
see supra note 203 and accompanying text (noting that, under Dodd-Frank, a securitybased swap agreement is a type of “swap”).
248
Further Definition of “Swap,” “Security-Based Swap,” and “Security-Based Swap
Agreement”; Mixed Swaps; Security-Based Swap Agreement Recordkeeping, 76 Fed.
Reg. at 29862–63.
249
See Elliott Assocs. v. Porsche Auto. Holding SE, 759 F. Supp. 2d 469, 475 n.3
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (referencing the financial reform and the term “security-based
swap”).
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B. A Beneficial Remnant of a Bygone Era?
Perhaps Congress merely was being pragmatic in leaving the
term “security-based swap agreement” and its associated provisions in
place. For over thirty years, the SEC and the CFTC have engaged in a
250
turf war.
In 1975, the SEC challenged the CFTC’s exclusive juris251
diction over futures contracts involving securities. In 1981, the SEC
asserted exclusive jurisdiction over “options on securities traded on a
national securities exchange” and provoked a lawsuit by the Chicago
252
Board of Trade, which claimed the CFTC had exclusive jurisdiction.
In 1982, the SEC and the CFTC resolved some jurisdictional disagreements through the Shad-Johnson Accord, which Congress subse253
quently enacted, but in the late 1980s, a jurisdictional dispute arose
254
again over stock index participation instruments.
Although the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit resolved the
dispute in favor of exclusive CFTC jurisdiction and “concluded that
the premise under the [Shad-Johnson Accord] was that if an instrument can be classified as both a security and a futures contract, exclusive jurisdiction lies with the CFTC,” jurisdictional disputes contin255
ued.
By keeping the security-based swap agreement concept in place
and giving the SEC and the CFTC joint rulemaking authority to define it, Congress may have been trying to leave an easy venue for
compromise and a solution that could mitigate jurisdictional disputes. Specifically, Congress may have intended that the two commissions include in the scope of the term “security-based swap
agreement” derivatives with respect to which the commissions disagreed as to jurisdiction. By doing so, those derivatives would be subject to the general jurisdiction of the CFTC and the SEC would have

250
See 2 JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 8, § 4.05[8], [9], at 1000–11 (recounting
the SEC’s challenges to the CFTC’s jurisdiction); Jerry W. Markham, Merging the SEC
and CFTC—A Clash of Cultures, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 537, 552 (2009) (“The SEC and
CFTC have a history of clashing over their respective jurisdictions, and their regulatory approaches are often sharply distinctive and incompatible.”).
251
2 JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 8, § 4.05[8], at 1000.
252
Id. § 4.05[8], at 1000–01 (citing Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. SEC, 677 F.2d 1137 (7th
Cir. 1982), vacated as moot, 459 U.S. 1026 (1982)).
253
Markham, supra note 250, at 569. For the codification of the accord, see Futures Trading Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-444, 96 Stat. 2294 (codified in scattered
sections of 7, 15, and 29 U.S.C.).
254
2 JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 8, § 4.05[8], at 1008.
255
Id. § 4.05[8], at 1009 (quoting Chi. Mercantile Exch. v. SEC, 883 F.2d 537 (7th
Cir. 1989)).
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256

concurrent antifraud jurisdiction.
If this was Congress’s intent,
however, the CFTC and the SEC have not used their rulemaking au257
thority in that way.
In addition, concurrent jurisdiction might be viewed as beneficial in light of the different regulatory approaches taken by the SEC
and the CFTC. “[F]utures regulation has been preoccupied with the
protection of the commercial uses and benefits of those markets,
while securities regulation has focused primarily on protection for
258
the investment-minded public.”
These historical focuses suggest
that the SEC may be more adept at antifraud enforcement than the
CFTC and that therefore the market would benefit by the SEC’s retaining its antifraud jurisdiction over security-based swap agreements
even though such jurisdiction would be concurrent with the CFTC’s
broad jurisdiction over those instruments.
Of course, the SEC has had this antifraud jurisdiction for over
ten years and has used it only five times. Even so, one might argue
that there is no harm—and that there could be some benefit—in
leaving the SEC with antifraud jurisdiction over security-based swap
agreements. Such jurisdiction certainly gives the SEC more latitude
in its enforcement efforts, and having security-based swap agreements
subject to the antifraud provisions of both the securities laws and the
259
commodities laws might create a stronger deterrent effect.
On the other hand, giving overly broad and unnecessary jurisdiction to the SEC can stretch the SEC too thin. It can result, for example, in the SEC’s being slow to stop the mastermind of a multi260
billion dollar Ponzi scheme, while pursuing antifraud enforcement
against a stockbroker who misappropriated a mere $343,000 of his

256

See supra Part IV (indicating that a security-based swap agreement is subject to
SEC antifraud jurisdiction, but it also is a “swap,” which is subject to the general jurisdiction of the CFTC).
257
See supra note 210 and accompanying text (noting the limited attention that
the CFTC and the SEC have given to the security-based swap agreements).
258
2 JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 8, § 4.05[9], at 1011.
259
Indeed, CFTC Chairman Gary Gensler has suggested that, for some over-thecounter derivatives, the SEC and the CFTC “will share jurisdiction”—that “[t]here
will be two cops on the beat.” Yin Wilczek, CFTC, SEC to Face Challenges in Defining
Jurisdiction Over OTC Swaps, Gensler Says, BNA SEC. L. DAILY, Nov. 15, 2010.
260
See Yin Wilczek & Phyllis Diamond, 2010 Will Be Important for SEC Enforcers as
Division Continues to Rebuild Reputation, BNA SEC. L. DAILY, Jan. 25, 2010 (noting that
the SEC failed to uncover Bernard Madoff’s $50 billion Ponzi scheme); Cox Says Staff
Saw Red Flags with Madoff But Failed to Alert Full Commission to Act, BNA SEC. L. DAILY,
Dec. 17, 2008 (indicating that the SEC had received credible information about the
Madoff scheme as early as 1999, but failed to act).
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261

clients’ assets.
This risk of misallocation of resources is particularly
relevant when resources are limited. With the House Appropriations
Committee’s approving funding for the SEC in fiscal year 2012 equal
to that in 2011 and over $220 million less than what the President re262
quested, the SEC needs to focus on smart regulation, not more
regulation, and Congress needs to help the SEC do so.
Moreover, concurrent jurisdiction leads to the risk that neither
agency will take up enforcement with respect to wrongdoing or that
they will duplicate their efforts. In some situations, one agency may
fail to act based on the assumption that the other will do so. In others, both agencies may act, which could result in wasteful duplication
of efforts. With mammoth deficits saddling the United States, regulation needs to be efficient.
VI. CONCLUSION
Prior to Dodd-Frank, over-the-counter derivatives were largely
unregulated by the federal securities laws. In general, the onerous
registration and information-reporting requirements of the Securities
Act and the Exchange Act did not apply to them, and only over-thecounter derivatives that met the definition of “security-based swap
agreement” were subject to the antifraud provisions of Securities Act
section 17(a) and Exchange Act section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Congress changed all of that when it enacted Dodd-Frank. With the reform Act, Congress put in place a new and extensive regulatory
scheme for the over-the-counter derivatives market. Rather than doing away with the “security-based swap agreement” concept when it
crafted Dodd-Frank, however, Congress incorporated it. That was a
mistake.
The “security-based swap agreement” concept is fraught with
problems. Since 2000, when the concept first was introduced, the
SEC has brought related enforcement actions only five times, and
very few courts have considered the meaning of the term. Unfortunately, two courts have interpreted the term poorly, and there is a
risk that those poor interpretations will be perpetuated. In addition,
the definition of the term “security-based swap agreement” is overly
broad, arguably capturing swaps that do not raise securities-like fraud
risks. Moreover, retaining the concept in the Dodd-Frank scheme re261

See SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 816 (2002) (representing an enforcement
action under Exchange Act section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 with respect to the misappropriation by a stockbroker of $343,000 of his clients’ assets).
262
House Committee Passes Bill to Fund SEC, in FY 2012, at FY 2011 Levels, BNA SEC.
L. DAILY (June 24, 2011).
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sults in redundant antifraud jurisdiction that could prove costly and
wasteful at a time when government resources are running thin. Finally, the concept creates confusion in the already extremely complex Dodd-Frank regulatory apparatus.
When Congress enacted Dodd-Frank, it should have recognized
these problems and erased the “security-based swap agreement” concept from the federal securities laws. The eraser is still handy. It is
time for Congress to use it.

